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ABSTRACT 
This thesis endeavors to detennine whether Martin Heidegger' s Being and Time is consistent 
with enviromnentalism. Hubert Dreyfus' characterization of Being and Time as the decisive step 
towards technology will provide evidence for the non-enviromnental character of Being and 
Time. Joseph Fell and W. S. K. Cameron will demonstrate an inability to reconcile Being and 
Time with enviromnentalism, and Paul Farwell will be unable to change my conception of the 
authentic status of producing. My exegesis of Being and Time will detennine that the being-in-
the-world of Dasein is understood through a technological horizon in which all entities are 
subordinate to a productive and pragmatic schema. What Dasein primarily encounters in the 
enviromnent is not a robust understanding of nature as inherently valuable, but raw material. 
Thus, I will conclude that Being and Time is inconsistent with enviromnentalism. 
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Preface 
Much academic work has been devoted to connecting the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger to an ecological or environmental philosophy. 1 The majority of this work 
focuses on the later Heidegger in which there are clear instances of writings that resonate 
with ecological thinking. As an environmentalist, the question of the relation of 
Heidegger's philosophy to enviromnentalism is a source of concern to my own 
intellectual passions. Particularly appealing about this issue in Heidegger's philosophy is 
that a striking problematization of technology occurs in Heidegger's philosophy. 
However, the genuineness ofHeidegger's environmental commitments is not a clear cut 
story, and deciding whether or not the early Heidegger in Being and Time is presenting 
an ecological or enviromnental philosophy may go a fair way toward discerning how true 
to environmentalism Heidegger really was. Given that the scholarly literature on the 
ecological philosophy ofHeidegger primarily reflects the work of the later Heidegger 
without inquiring into whether Heidegger's philosophy was ecological earlier in his life, I 
will ask how faithful Heidegger was to environmentalism in Being and Time. 
1 See, for instance: Michael E. Zimmerman, "Toward a Heideggerean Ethos for Radical 
Enviromnentalism," Environmental Ethics 5, No. 3 (1983): 99- 131; Ladelle McWhorster 
& Gail Stenstad, Eds., H eidegger and the Earth: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009); Bruce V. Foltz, Inhabiting the Earth: 
Heidegger, Environmental Ethics, and the Metaphysics of Value, (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1995). Some of this work emphasizes the fourfold of earth and sky, 
mortals and divinities as a fundamental ecological concept. 
1 
Introduction 
Is the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in Being and Time consistent with 
enviromnentalism? This is the guiding question of our thesis. I put forward the following 
hypothesis: Being and Time understands being-in-the-world through a technological 
horizon that is inconsistent with enviromnentalism. 
My investigation will proceed in four parts: Chapter One will evaluate Hubert 
Dreyfus' interpretation of the teclmological significance of Being and Time, Chapter Two 
will be an immanent reading of Being and Time, Chapter Three will evaluate further 
scholarly literature, and Chapter Four will determine whether Being and Time is 
consistent with enviromnentalism. 
A word is in order about the methodology of this dissertation. We are beginning 
with Hubert Dreyfus' account of Being and Time because it succinctly states the essence 
of what I find problematic about Being and Time. Since there is a clear expression of my 
argument in Dreyfus' critical account of Being and Time, I have put Dreyfus at the 
beginning of my thesis. In order to engage critically with the rest of the scholarly 
literature, which, in my view, does not sufficiently understand what is enviromnentally 
problematic about Being and Time, a prior engagement with the text of Being and Time 
is necessary. Thus, the assessment of Joseph Fell, Paul Farwell, and W. S. K. Cameron 
follows my substantive exegesis and interpretation of Being and Time. It is significant to 
note that with the exception of Cameron's 2004 article there is no up-to-date relevant 
scholarship on the relation of Being and Time to enviromnentalism. 
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I will now define technology and environmentalism, but must first preface the 
formulation of enviromnentalism with a proviso. The object of this thesis is not to 
provide an exhaustive account of the theoretical foundations of environmentalism. I 
myself am an environmentalist and am engaging with Being and Time in terms of my 
prior understanding of the meaning of environmentalism. My understanding of 
enviromnentalism does not claim to exhaust the literature on enviromnentalism, but I do 
claim, in my terms, to have accurately reduced my enviromnentalism to its definitive 
features. In order to understand the environmental significance of Being and Time it is 
not necessary to ground one's interpretation in current theories in environmental 
philosophy. The intuition that there may be something enviromnentally problematic 
about Being and Time can occur quite independently of a familiarity with theoretical 
debates in environmental philosophy. The basic schema for an environmental philosophy 
that I am about to provide is adequate to the task of giving a background on the basis of 
which I can critically engage with the environmental content of Being and Time. 
How can we define technology? Technology is a set of practices oriented towards 
the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production and consumption. 
Specifically, it is the machinery, equipment, and products produced from industrial 
modes of production. Modem technology implies a total mobilization of nature for 
production such that nature becomes a mere raw material. To borrow from Heidegger, it 
"is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that 
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can be extracted and stored as such."2 The unreasonable and non-environmental character 
of technology is that it demands of nature more than it can sustainably produce. 
We can define environmentalism in tenns of three fundamental conditions. It (a) 
believes nature to possess a biocentric value or meaning; (b) places a positive value on 
hannonizing human existence with nature; and (c) aims to conserve the natural integrity 
of the environment through reducing productive and consumptive activities. Such 
practices aim to maintain a sustainable relationship to the earth whereby all natural 
beings can flourish. 
We can clearly see that modem technological practices are contrary to 
environmental practices. In a technological paradigm nature is not understood as having 
an intrinsic value, but is valued for its serviceability to instrumental uses. In a 
technological paradigm, one does not harmonize with nature, but, rather, manipulates it 
as though it were a raw material. Lastly, rather than conserving nature through reducing 
production, the modem technological paradigm involves a total mobilization of nature 
that unreasonably demands that nature supply more energy than it can sustainably 
produce. Environmentalism lets nature be; whereas, technology does not let nature be. 
A further illustration of the nature of enviromnentalism is in order. The question 
may persist: what do we mean by environmentalism? Environmentalism is a practice 
whose primary object is to accord human existence with the conditions of 
enviromnentalism we have enumerated. On the one hand, environmental practices 
2 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays , translated 
by William Lovitt, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 14. 
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involve acting in ways that conserve the natural envirorunent. One, as it were, limits 
one's practices as a consumer and producer in keeping with the principles that prevent 
pollution and conserve nature. The issue is essentially that one reduces one's ecological 
footprint. 
Another definitive condition of enviromnentalism is essentially bound up with 
this kind of praxis that conserves the envirorunent. That is to say that the hannony of 
human beings with nature essentially depends on whether our practices conserve the 
natural integrity of the envirorunent by a reduction of our ecological footprint. In the idea 
of hannonizing with the enviromnent, there is a romantic notion of nature whereby what 
grows naturally in our external enviromnent resonates with the organic process of growth 
inside ourselves. Envirorunentalism involves the notion of a balance of nature whereby 
all beings are in a state of ecological equilibrium that can be disturbed by pollution or 
non-enviromnental productive practices. Harmony with nature, moreover, involves a 
sense by which we understand nature to possess normative value. In hannonizing with 
nature outside ourselves, we are acting according to a meaning intrinsic to our own nature 
and to the wider enviromnent. 
Thus, the idea ofhannony with nature leads into another one of our conditions of 
enviromnentalism: that there is a meaning in nature. An envirorunental worldview 
believes that nature is a meaningful order that exhibits an organization that possesses 
intrinsic value. With this idea, we are at the frontier of something that our intellectual 
culture generally has little patience for: the idea that there is a telos or logos in nature. A 
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common ecological intuition is that the environment that surrounds us is not an inert dead 
reality, but a kind ofliving activity. Natural processes are interrelated such that the life 
of human beings is dependent on the wider ecosystem. There is, as it were, a web of life. 
The sun, the rain, the forest, and all other elements of nature are part of a single common 
biocentric order of meaning. The ability of the human species to flourish depends in part 
on the ability to hannonize with and conserve the meaning of this nature beyond 
ourselves. Thus, the way that human beings should exist on the earth is fundamentally 
determined by the teleological meaning inherent in nature. In understanding nature we 
are grasping an order that exists independently of the mind and on which the purposes 
and very existence of human life is dependent. For enviromnentalists, the meaning of 
nature signifies a possible foundation for grounding human culture. The task of 
rationally understanding the vital nature of the environment, as something that embodies 
a distinct meaning and form, is a task beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one that, I 
would suggest, is essential to the foundations of environmentalism. 
Central to the argument of this thesis is that a philosophy consistent with 
environmentalism must possess a robust theory of nature in which nature is understood to 
be a meaningful and valuable order of being-in-itself. So too must such a philosophy 
advocate harmony with nature and the conservation of nature. However, an 
understanding of nature as inherently meaningful is particularly essential to whether a 
philosophy is environmental. Enviromnental intuitions are inseparable from the view that 
nature has an intrinsic significance and should not merely be subject to technological 
production. 
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We will now summarize the technological narrative implicit in Heidegger's 
"history of Being." In the aftennath of Being and Time, Heidegger declares a 
fundamental decline to be implicit in post-Socratic philosophy. Plato is symptomatic of a 
metaphysical detennination that has fatalistically detennined the course of Western 
history and has consummated itself in modem technology. The decline in the thinking of 
Being leads directly into modem teclmology. We thus see that technology is, in a 
significant way, problematic for Heidegger. 
"The Question Concerning Technology," while giving expression to the idea that 
there is a danger in technology, also sees a saving power in technology. To Heidegger, 
technology is a kind of revealing. It is a mode of aletheia whereby Being reveals itselr_3 
En framing is the claim that challenges human beings to reveal the real in tenns of the 
"standing reserve" of teclmology. 4 Technology, as a way of revealing, is a kind of 
destining detenninative of human history. 5 
Heidegger holds that meditative thinking can resist the technological power latent 
in calculative thinking.6 As opposed to the technological nature of calculative thinking, 
Heidegger proposes that "releasement" can lead to a free relation to technology. 
However, meditative thinking, and the "releasement towards things" that accompanies it, 
does not change our continued consumption of technologies, and, thus, does not reduce 
3 See: Ibid., p. 13. 
4 See: Ibid. , p. 19. 
5 See: Ibid., p. 24 
6 See: Martin Heidegger, "Memorial Address," in Discourse on Thinking, translated by E. 
Hans Freund & J. M. Anderson, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1959). 
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our ecological footprint. Rather than advising us to limit the practices that can prevent 
the proliferation of technology, Heidegger tells us to be open to the mystery in 
technology. The danger that Heidegger fears is not so much that technology will reduce 
the earth to a raw material, but that technology will lead to a triumph of calculative 
thinking over meditative thinking. 
Despite any ambiguities in Heidegger's understanding of technology, we find a 
clear environmental tone in many of the later writings ofHeidegger. In "Building 
Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger writes that "mortals dwell in that they save the earth."7 
In "The Letter on Humanism" we hear that an environmental disclosure of nature is 
possible: "It could even be that nature, in the face it turns towards man's technical 
mastery, is simply concealing its essence."8 In "The lster" there is an engagement with 
the nature philosophy of Friedrich Holderlin that enchants our understanding of the 
natural environment. In 1955, at a Memorial Address in Messkirch, Heidegger raises 
alarm in an environmental manner at the loss of rootedness in the earth: "The world now 
appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thought, attacks that nothing is 
believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy 
source for modem technology and industry."9 
7 Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," in Basic Writings, translated by 
David Farrell Krell, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 352. 
8 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Basic Writings, translated by David 
Farrell Krell, (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), p. 228-9. 
9 Martin Heidegger, "Memorial Address," p. 50. 
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There seems to be a fundamentally environmental impetus in the later philosophy 
of Martin Heidegger. Thus, I am inclined to see a division in the philosophy of Martin 
Heidegger, which does not admit of continuity on the question of environmentalism. 
While the later Heidegger was certainly at times environmental, the early Heidegger in 
Being and Time may not be environmental. It would seem that there was a point of 
insight in Heidegger's "tum" that led into a questioning of technology and the aspiration 
for an environmental ethos. However, this is not the subject of this thesis. 
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Chapter One 
1.1 
We have put forward the hypothesis that Being and Time understands Dasein's 
being-in-the-world within a technological horizon. Is there evidence in the scholarly 
literature to support this claim? Indeed, there is. Hubert Dreyfus states that Being and 
Time is the decisive step towards technology. Harold Alderman states that in Being and 
Time "technological work becomes identified with Being."10 Andrew Feenberg states 
that Being and Time is a "productionist text." 11 Michael Zimmerman, in addition to 
telling us that Being and Time understands being-in-the-world in terms of instrumental 
tools, states that "Heidegger believed, moving beyond the nihilism and violence brought 
by modem technology was possible only on the condition that humanity first submit to 
the claim of modem technology."12 Theodore Kisiel states: 
The field of objects which yields the original sense of being is that of the 
produced object accessible in the course of usage. Accordingly, it is not 
the field of things in their theoretical reification but rather the world 
encountered in going about our producing, making, and using which is the 
basis, the according-to-which and towards-which of the original 
experience ofbeing ... Being means being produced. 13 
10 Harold Alderman, "Heidegger's Critique of Science and Technology," in Heidegger 
and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays, edited by Michael Murray, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1978), p. 47. 
11 Andrew Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The Catastrophe and Redemption of 
History, (New York: Routledge, 2005), p. xiv. 
12 Michael Zimmennan, Heidegger 's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, 
Politics, and Art, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), p. 47. 
13 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger 's Being and Time, (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), p. 264. 
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The scholarly literature we will examine offers support for our hypothesis that 
Being and Time understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon. 
Dreyfus essentially understands the distinctly technological character of what is 
enviromnentally problematic about Being and Time, but backs away from the conclusion 
that Being and Time is fully technological by virtue of narrowing his definition of 
technology. Through a critical engagement with Joseph Fell, Paul Farwell, and W.S.K. 
Cameron, my position emerges as the stronger evaluation ofHeidegger's thought. Fell 
cannot change our understanding that the ready-to-hand (handiness) is the primary kind 
of nature in Being and Time. Farwell, while indicating that production is not emblematic 
of authenticity, cannot change our understanding of the authentic status of production. 
Cameron succinctly shows that the instrumental and anthropocentric understanding of the 
enviromnent is problematic, but is unable to show that this problem resolves itself. Thus, 
the scholarly literature leaves open the possibility of concluding that Being and Time is 
inconsistent with enviromnentalism. 
1.2 
We will begin our account of the scholarly literature on the enviromnental status 
of Being and Time with an engagement with the philosopher Hubert Dreyfus. In 
"Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment," Dreyfus presents a decisive analysis of 
Being and Time with respect to enviromnentalism which resonates with our hypothesis 
that Being and Time understands being-in-the-world within a technological horizon. 
Enviromnentalism is not explicitly referred to in Dreyfus' text. However, it is implicit 
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that Being and Time does not present an environmental philosophy insofar as it leads to 
the teclmological "assault" and "attack" on nature. Our analysis will show that Dreyfus 
correctly interprets Being and Time to be a decisive step towards technology. 
Dreyfus raises the question of the enviromnental status of Being and Time 
through an engagement with the technological content of Being and Time: "To what 
extent is the account of the being of equipment in Being and Time a critique of the 
ontology of technology and to what extent is it a contribution to the development of a 
technological understanding ofBeing?"14 Dreyfus argues that Being and Time plays a 
"transitional role in the history of the being of equipment."' 5 Though Dreyfus states "it is 
not clear whether Being and Time opposes technology or promotes it," 16 he admits that 
"far from resisting the modem tendency to transfonn everything into standing-reserve, 
the understanding of the being of the ready-to-hand in Being and Time leaves equipment 
available for the assault oftechnology." 17 
Dreyfus notes that the distinction of subject and object makes modem technology 
possible. Being and Time offers a phenomenological critique of the subject-object 
distinction through the analysis ofDasein as being-in-the-world, and, hence, "Being and 
Time would seem to stand in direct opposition to the technological understanding of 
14 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment," in Heidegger: A 
Critical Reader, edited by Hubert Dreyfus & Harrison Hall, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 173. 
15 Ibid., p. 175 
16 Ibid., p. 175 
I 7 Ibid. , p. 175. 
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Being."18 Moreover, the primacy of readiness-to-hand (handiness) over presence-at-hand 
(objective presence) is an implicit criticism of calculative and logistic ontologies in that 
these "present-at-hand" modes of thinking are dependent "upon the nonformalizable 
everyday intelligibility of the primordial way human beings encounter entities within the 
world."19 Thus, the understanding of equipmental practices will rescue beings from the 
objectifying representations of a Cartesian ontology that employs mathematical 
technology. Since Being and Time "explicitly denies the possibility of a 'mathematical 
functionalization' 20 of the ready-to-hand,"21 Heidegger, in this view, resists technology 
by denying the possibility that the mathematical functions that structure modem 
technology could impose themselves on our everyday tool-using practices.22 
However, there are, Dreyfus suggests, "hints scattered throughout Heidegger's 
later works that in opposing the subject/object ontology by an appeal to the primacy of 
equipment, Being and Time was itself a fonnulation of the penultimate stage of 
technology. "23 Heidegger' s opposition to ... 
... the Cartesian subject/object distinction in terms of an account ofDasein 
as a user of equipment becomes an ambiguous fonn of opposition, for it is 
no longer clear whether such an analysis offers a critique of technology in 
the form of a transcendental account of the pre-technological everyday 
understanding of equipment, or whether, under the guise of a 
18 Ibid., p. 173. 
19 Ibid., p. 174. 
20 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by Joan Stambaugh (Revised Dennis J. 
Schmidt), (Albany: State University of New York, 201 0), p. 88. 
21 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment," p. 176. 
22 We will later show that the present-at-hand is not technological insofar as it is does not 
use, produce, or manipulate the environment. 
23 Ibid., p. 174 
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transcendental account of everyday activity, such an analysis reflects a 
transition in the history of the way equipment is which prepares the way 
for technology.24 
Thus, Heidegger's critique of the functionalization of everyday ready-to-hand practices 
may possess positive environmental significance, but these very practices lead into 
technology. 
Dreyfus states "the central theme of Division 1 of Being and Time, [is] that ready-
to-hand equipment is ontologically more fundamental than present-at-hand objects."25 
My argument will show that this prioritization is contrary to an environmental philosophy 
insofar as nature is discovered by the use of equipment rather than through its pre-
productive existence. The identification of nature with the proximally ready-to-hand 
indicates an understanding of the world that is not environmental as it reduces nature to 
an instrument. 
Dreyfus cautions against the notion that the account of equipment in Being and 
Time is fully technological. The transitional role that Dreyfus understands Being and 
Time to serve implies "that the analysis of equipment in Being and Time is neither pre-
technological nor fully technological."26 However, Dreyfus recognizes that Heidegger's 
notion of equipment is not resistant to the tendency to transform nature into a 
technological standing-reserve. Equipment is "at-hand" for the anti-environmental 
assault of technology by means of the ready-to-hand understanding of nature. 
24 Ibid., p. 175. 
25 Ibid., p. 174. 
26 Ibid., p. 175. 
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Dreyfus delineates three modes in the history of the being of equipment: 
craftsmanship, industrialization, and cybernetic control or technology, which, 
respectively, correspond to techne, pragmatism, and systems theory. Nature is 
understood in craftsmanship as physis, in industrialization as a raw material, and in 
cybernetic control as standing-reserve. Showing an environmental disposition, Dreyfus 
presents such a transition from craftsmanship to industrial production to technology as a 
decline. 
Dreyfus thinks Being and Time espouses "a simple pragmatism,"27 so, one would 
think, Dreyfus identifies Being and Time with industrial production, which, to our 
understanding, bears a technological character. However, Dreyfus argues that it is 
unclear what kind of production Heidegger has in mind in Being and Time: 
Being and Time offers an understanding of the being of equipment which 
hovers ambiguously between that of craftsmanship and technology and so 
tempts readers to identify Being and Time with one or the other, while at 
the same time resisting either assimilation.28 
Dreyfus inquires into how we use equipment and remarks that disposability 
characterizes equipment. However, a hammer, though defined by its function or in-
order-to, is not disposable like a product that is used and disposed of. In Being and Time, 
we can take "care of equipment - not the way the craftsman takes care of his personal 
tools, but the way the foreman takes care of industrial equipment."29 We read, in Being 
and Time, of the foreman caring for industrial equipment in that care can possess a "kind 
27 Ibid. , p. 177. 
28 Ibid. , p. 176. 
29 Ibid. , p. 177. 
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of circumspection, such as 'inspecting', checking up on what has been attained, or 
looking over the 'operations. "'30 To Dreyfus, the use of equipment in Being and Time is 
not envirorunentally benign because of this industrial connotation and because of its 
disposable nature. 
Dreyfus distinguishes between three kinds of use in Heidegger's writings. The 
first kind of use is compatible with envirorunentalism and corresponds to craftsmanship. 
This use does not dispose of things, lets a thing be what it is, and is responsive to the 
demands that the thing makes on us as we use it. There is something "reliable" and 
"resistant" in this kind of use that relates the user with the used in such a way that things 
are not exploited. The second kind of use corresponds to industrial production and refers 
"to utility as fulfilling a function."31 The third kind of use corresponds to technology and 
refers "to using-up as exploitation."32 This last "degenerate fonn of use - exploiting-
clearly corresponds to the technological attitude in which equipment is only insofar as it 
is at our disposal."33 To my mind, the notion in Being and Time that tree is timber and a 
mountain is quarry corresponds, in its totalizing mobilization, to utility or using-up more 
so than to the use that "lets be." Thus, we see evidence that the kind of use of the 
envirorunent in Being and Time is, within Dreyfus' schema, technological. 
Dreyfus raises the issue of the kind of nature that belongs to natural beings in 
Being and Time. The Greek conception of physis, which corresponds to craftsmanship, is 
30 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 358. 
3 1 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger' s History of the Being of Equipment," p. 177. 
32 Ibid. , p. 177. 
33 Ibid. , p. 176. 
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self-contained and environmental because it enables nature to be independent and free. 
However, according to Dreyfus, nature is a raw material in Being and Time, which, rather 
than being identified with physis, corresponds to industrial production. The nature of 
physis exhibits a subordinate role in Being and Time as nature "can be encountered only 
as it fits , or fails to fit, into the referential totality. "34 
Dreyfus has, by our definition of technology, conceded that Being and Time 
understands nature technologically because of the admission that nature is a raw material 
for industrial production. Dreyfus has a smaller domain of objects corresponding to 
technology insofar as, to his understanding, industrial production does not correspond to 
technology. However, it is hard to see how radios, automobiles, and other industrial 
products are not technological. Both industrial production and technology are "a 
challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can 
be extracted and stored as such."35 It would seem that Dreyfus, in stating that nature in 
Being and Time is a raw material corresponding to industrialization, has conceded a 
technological status to Being and Time. 
Does Being and Time, contrary to environmentalism, solely understand nature as 
a raw material? Is a river, in Being and Time, more than a mere energy source, or is it 
"that the use of the river as water-power is the primordial way the river is 
encountered?"36 On this question, Dreyfus says Being and Time demonstrates a profound 
34 Ibid., p. 183 . 
35 Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, p. 14. 
36 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment," p. 179. 
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ambiguity. In order to answer this question we will examine how Dasein encounters 
nature in Being and Time. 
Heidegger identifies three ways of encountering nature - readiness-to-hand, 
presence-at-hand, and the nature that "stirs and strives." Heidegger ignores the 
environmental kind of nature of physis, ignores the nature that "stirs and strives," and 
does not mention "the hidden riches of nature." Thus, "in the language of the later 
Heidegger, Being and Time has no place for the withdrawal and resistance of the 
Earth."37 Presence-at-hand is also secondary as it is shown to be a privative mode of 
readiness-to-hand. Thus, the only remaining avenue in which nature, in Being and Time, 
can be encountered is through readiness-to-hand. Thus, contrary to enviromnentalism, 
Being and Time pragmatically understands nature through utility. 
Dreyfus provides a further analysis of the ambiguity in Being and Time over the 
question as to whether nature is itself something ready-to-hand. Nature, according to 
Being and Time, is not intrinsically ready-to-hand or present-at-hand, but is ontologically 
founded on the worldliness of the world and Dasein's being-in-the-world. Though 
Heidegger acknowledges nature to be worldly, the worldliness of the world, through 
which one understands nature, is a ready-to-hand network of relevant relations of 
significance (in-order-to, what-for, for-the-sake-of-which). There is, according to 
Dreyfus, a technological tendency "in the ontological priority granted to the structure of 
37 Ibid. , p. 177. 
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the totality of involvement as the structure of the world."38 Since Heidegger conflates 
worldliness with readiness-to-hand, "all beings including those of nature are founded 
ontologically, i.e. get their intelligibility from the structure of the equipmental totality." 39 
Nature is ready-to-hand insofar as worldliness is ready-to-hand. 
Dreyfus analyzes the attempt ofHeidegger to resist the conclusion that Being and 
Time understands nature through readiness-to-hand. The tool-analysis of the 
enviromnent in its equipmentality is, as Heidegger says, preliminary and prepares the 
way for the transcendental account of the world. However, the present, in the temporal 
schema that is the transcendental condition of the possibility of the world, is the in-order-
to: "The horizontal schema of the present is detennined by the in-order-to ."40 Heidegger 
repeats the claim that "relations of significance ... determine the structure of the world. "41 
Thus, Dreyfus remarks that "even on the transcendental level, the world is equated with 
the totality of involvements, and all entities, including Nature, can only be encountered as 
they show up in the equipmental world."42 Thus, nature is only disclosed through 
readiness-to-hand. 
Dreyfus argues that Heidegger denies the locality of the region and thereby 
exhibits a technological philosophy. A region, such as a workshop or room, is the 
condition of the possibility of equipment. Thus, "a region must already be discovered if 
38 Ibid., p. 181. 
39 Ibid., p. 180. 
40 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 365. 
41 Ibid., p. 211. 
42 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment," p. 180. 
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there is to be any possibility of referring and finding the places of a totality of useful 
things available to circumspection."43 However, Heidegger wants to found a region, and 
the spatiality ofbeings encountered therein, on the worldliness of the world, and, 
therefore, "it is as if in Being and Time Dasein is uprooted from the dwelling in nearness 
which is illustrated by later Heidegger."44 Being and Time takes equipment "to be 
dependent on one total network in which it is a node,"45 and the thing is not something 
that organizes a local region, but rather it is "a slot in a global system."46 This 
technological idea that "equipment more and more comes to fit together in one single 
system is already a step from the relatively autonomous and autochthonous workshop of 
the craftsman towards the uprooted interconnectedness of industrial mass production."47 
Dreyfus concludes: 
By highlighting the interrelationships between all items of equipment and 
by defining equipment by its position in this referential totality, Being and 
Time denies localness, thus removing the last barrier to global totalization, 
and preparing the way for the "total mobilization of all beings" which, 
according to later Heidegger, makes up the essence oftechnology.48 
Being and Time, as a transition in the history of the being of equipment, is "the 
decisive step towards technology."49 Dreyfus qualifies the sense in which Being and 
Time is technological by saying that "in Being and Time there is no outright attack [on 
43 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 103. 
44 Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger' s History of the Being of Equipment," p. 181. 
45 lbid. , p. 181. 
46 Ibid. , p. 181. 
47 Ibid. , p. 182. 
48 Ibid. , p. 182. 
49 Ibid. , p. 182. 
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nature]."50 However, this appears as a minor qualification when, by contrast, Dreyfus 
states that "the account of worldhood in Being and Time, however, removes every 
vestige of resistance - that of physis and earth, as well as that of will and subjectivity - to 
the technological tendency to treat all beings (even man) as resources."51 Moreover, 
Dreyfus notes that the lack of receptivity in Being and Time "to 'the nature that stirs and 
strives' .. .leaves open, indeed, encourages, the kind of attack and reordering of nature 
which encounters natural objects as standing reserve."52 This comes very close to an 
admission that Being and Time is fully technological. Dreyfus ends by stating that 
ordering the world teclmologically simply for the sake of ordering the world 
technologically "is the understanding of Being definitive of technological nihilism, an 
understanding prepared but not consummated by the account of equipment in Being and 
Time."53 The claim that Being and Time leads into technology offers support for our 
hypothesis that Being and Time understands the world within a technological horizon that 
is inconsistent with environmentalism. However, owing to his strict definition of 
technology, Dreyfus evades judging Being and Time to be fully technological. 
50 Ibid., p. 183. 
51 Ibid., p. 183-4. 
52 Ibid., p. 183. 
53 Ibid., p. 184. 
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Chapter Two 
2.1 
This chapter will investigate Being and Time with respect to the guiding question 
of our thesis. The bulk of this chapter will investigate "The Worldliness of the World," 
which is Chapter Three of Division One of Being and Time, as here there is an explicit 
account of how Dasein exists in the environment. My interpretation will also include the 
other sections of Being and Time that are apposite to the question of our thesis and help 
to detennine whether Being and Time is an environmental text. 
This particular section of my thesis will provide an exposition of average 
everdayness as a theme of the analytic of Dasein. The analytic of Dasein in Being and 
Time analyzes average everydayness in order to reveal structures constitutive of the being 
ofDasein. Heidegger wants to understand the being ofDasein ontologically in its 
phenomenally nearest kind of being, and, as such, Heidegger seeks to make average 
everydayness "accessible in its positive characteristics."54 Average everydayness 
characterizes Dasein initially and for the most part, and is the everyday undifferentiated 
and indifferent character of Dasein. The indifference of average everydayness is "a 
positive phenomenal characteristic."55 Moreover, average everydayness may not be 
54 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 44. 
55 Ibid., p. 43 . 
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"structurally different from the ontological determinations of an authentic being of 
Dasein. "56 
However, though the average everyday interpretation of Dasein is positive and 
potentially authentic, it is a preliminary interpretation ofDasein. The aim of the average 
everyday interpretation ofDasein is "to expose the horizon for the most primordial 
interpretation ofbeing."57 Due to its preliminary nature and because it may not be 
primordial, an average everyday mode of being-in-the-world may not provide the final 
basis upon which one can assess the environmental dimensions of Being and Time. 
2.2 
This section of my thesis will provide an analysis of objective presence 
(presence-at-hand). 58 "Objectively present" translates "Vorhandenheit", which can also 
be denoted by "presence-at-hand" and being "occurrent." Objective presence is a mode 
of existence that expresses the "whatness" of a thing in a categorical way. Theoretical 
knowledge in the sciences fundamentally concerns itself with objective presence. To 
Heidegger, objective presence is inappropriate to the being ofDasein because it is 
categorical and essentially indifferent to the being of Dasein. 
Heidegger investigates the notion of objective presence in the context of a 
consideration of how Dasein knows the world. Knowing belongs to being-in-the-world 
56 Ibid., p. 44. 
57 Ibid., p. 17. 
58 This chapter will refer to presence-at-hand as objective presence in keeping with the 
tenninology of the Stambaugh translation of Being and Time. 
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and is grounded in already-being-alongside-the-world. In already-being-alongside-the-
world, Dasein does not primarily stare at something objectively present, but is engaged 
with and absorbed by its world. Thus, "being-in-the-world, as taking care of things, is 
taken in by the world which it takes care of."59 For an objectively present knowing of 
things to arise through observation there must be a deficiency in the way Dasein 
concerns itself in its doings in the world. Such a deficiency arises when Dasein 
refrains from producing, manipulating, and using the environment and merely lingers 
with the world. This way of being enables Dasein to "encounter beings within the 
world solely in their mere outward appearance ( eidos)."60 Looking in this manner is a 
way of setting one' s sight on objective presence. Objectively present looking at things 
"becomes a mode of independent dwelling together with beings in the world. In this 
dwelling [ "Aufenthalt"}- as refraining from every manipulation and use - the 
p erception of what is objectively present takes place."61 
We note here an affinity between environmentalism and objective presence. 
Insofar as it refrains from the manipulation, production, and use of the environment, an 
objective presence corresponds with an environmental way of being. Teclmology is a 
specific way in which Dasein uses, produces, and manipulates its environment. Thus, 
prima facie, an objectively present mode of dwelling cannot be technological. In 
perceiving beings independently of all production and manipulation, nature is 
understood in its pristine purity. However, whether objective presence is in essence 
59 Ibid. , p. 61. 
60 Ibid., p. 61. 
61 Ibid., p. 61-62. 
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environmental is something we will detennine as we proceed through our 
investigation. 
Objective presence has an environmental significance that an environmental 
philosophy would not understand to be a deficiency. However, rather than positively 
characterize a way of being that does not manipulate the environment, Heidegger 
assigns a fundamentally deficient status to a way of being that refrains from producing, 
using, and manipulating. Thus, we have a reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent 
with environmentalism. 
2.3 
I shall now clarify the meaning of authenticity, inauthenticity, and show that 
Being and Time may prescribe a way of being-in-the-world for Dasein that is 
inconsistent with environmentalism. Authenticity and inauthenticity are possible due 
to the "mineness" that belongs to Dasein. Heidegger speaks of the possibility that 
Dasein can choose itself and win itself. Insofar as Dasein can have lost itself and be in 
need of gaining itself, Dasein "is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to 
itself."62 Authenticity is a way of being in which Dasein is free to choose to be itself 
Moreover, average everyday structures ofDasein ' s being can be identical to Dasein's 
authentic being. 
Inauthenticity is identified with the way ofbeing in which Dasein does not 
choose itself, but gets carried along by its lostness in the public realm of the "they." 
62 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Inauthenticity is not a "lower" degree of being, but signifies Dasein in several of its 
concrete and positive modes of being-in-the-world. 
For the ends of this thesis what is important is that there is a prescriptive 
ontology ofDasein at work in Being and Time. A prescription is a guide, directive, or 
rule that is binding for Dasein. Though Heidegger offers a neutral phenomenological 
description ofDasein's being, the authentic mode ofDasein's being-in-the-world is a 
prescriptive guide that states how Dasein should comport itself in the world. If it turns 
out that a way ofbeing-in-the-world that is fundamentally inconsistent with 
environmentalism is also understood to be authentic, then we will understand Being 
and Time to prescribe a way ofbeing-in-the-world that is inconsistent with 
environmentalism. Moreover, insofar as average everyday structures ofDasein's being 
can be authentic, there is reason to suspect that what Heidegger describes in Division 
One of Being and Time may have an additional prescriptive significance. 
2.4 
In "The Worldliness of the World," Chapter Three of Division One of Being and 
Time, Heidegger aims to make being-in-the-world visible with regard to the structure of 
the world. Heidegger's project in Being and Time seeks being in the ontological sense, 
and, therefore, his phenomenological ontology will aim to reveal the world ontologically. 
We will , at present, investigate how Heidegger approaches the phenomenon of the world 
and show that worldliness is the structure that Heidegger seeks to reveal. 
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Heidegger is not concerned with describing the ontical and pre-phenomenological 
look of beings that appear in the world. Rather, a phenomenological description of the 
world amounts to showing the being of objectively present beings and fixing this being in 
categorical concepts. The beings present in the world, according to the common standard 
of interpretation, are things of nature and things of value. Heidegger will move his 
analysis away from an understanding of things as having value. Things of value are 
founded on things of nature, are merely innerworldly, and cannot arrive at the 
phenomenon of the world. 
Neither can explicating the being of nature arrive at the phenomenon of the world. 
The primary sense of nature that Heidegger has in mind in this chapter of Being and Time 
is the nature of the natural sciences and what is objectively present in the world. Nature, 
writes Heidegger, "is itself a being which is encountered within the world and is 
discoverable on various paths and stages."63 An ontology of nature, vis-a-vis the natural 
sciences, does not reach the phenomenon of the world because nature is a being 
encountered in the world that presupposes the world. 
Heidegger wants us to encounter the worldliness of the world, which "is an 
ontological concept and designates the structure of a constitutive factor of being-in-the-
world." 64 Since being-in-the-world is an existential detennination of Dasein and 
worldliness is constitutive ofbeing-in-the-world, worldliness is also existential. World 
63 Ibid. , p. 63 . 
64 Ibid. , p. 64. 
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signifies a determination of Dasein, and, thus, an ontological investigation into the world 
is also an ontological investigation within the analytic ofDasein. 
Heidegger delineates four senses of the world. The first is an ontical-categorical 
sense: "1. World is used as an ontic concept and signifies the totality of beings which can 
be objectively present within the world."65 The second sense of the world is an 
ontological-categorical sense: "2. World functions as an ontological tenn and signifies 
the being of those beings named in 1."66 In this case, one can think of the world of 
mathematical objects. The third sense of "world" is an ontical-existentiell sense that can 
refer to the public world ofDasein: "3. Again, world can be understood in an ontic sense, 
but not as beings essentially unlike Dasein that can be encountered within the world; but, 
rather, as that 'in which' a factical Dasein 'lives' as Dasein."67 The fourth sense of the 
world is an ontological-existential sense: "4. Finally, world designates the ontological 
and existential concept of worldliness. "68 Worldliness is a kind of being that belongs to 
Dasein and never refers to something objectively present in the world. 
Ontology all too often passes over the phenomenon of worldliness. Instead of 
interpreting the world, the attempt is made "to interpret the world in tenns of the being 
which is present within the world but has not, however, even been initially discovered, 
that is, in tenns of nature. "69 An ontology that substitutes nature for the world and 
65 Ibid., p. 64. 
66 Ibid., p. 64. 
67 Ibid., p. 65 
68 Ibid., p. 65. 
69 Ibid., p. 65. 
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interprets nature as objectively present beings within the world passes over the 
phenomenon of worldliness. Such an ontology deprives the world of its worldliness by 
using nature as an ontological and categorical "limit case of the being of possible 
innerworldly beings." 70 As such, nature, as a categorical content of structures, "can never 
render worldliness intelligible."71 Nature does not determine being-in-the-world, but, 
rather, nature is itself discoverable through being-in-the-world. 
The sense of "nature" that conveys the sense of an environmentalist ethic is 
distinct from the scientific and objectively present sense of nature. Heidegger writes: 
"even the phenomenon 'nature,' for instance in the sense ofthe Romantic concept of 
nature, is ontologically comprehensible only in tenns of the concept of world; that is, in 
tenns of an analytic ofDasein."72 Thus, the nature of the environmentalist can only be 
clarified and understood through the concept of worldliness and the analytic ofDasein. 
Moreover, we see that Heidegger distinguishes this envirorunental conception of nature 
from objective presence, which refers to a theoretical and scientific kind of nature. 
Being-in-the-world, and hence the world itself, "must be the subject of our 
analytic in the horizon of average everydayness as the nearest kind of being ofDasein."73 
Thus, an analytic ofthe average everydayness ofDasein's being-in-the-world is the 
departure point in our investigation into the worldliness of the world. Something like the 
70 Ibid. , p. 65 
71 Ibid., p. 65. 
72 Ibid., p. 65. The Romantic conception of nature is environmental in that it has a strong 
appreciation of a nature that "stirs and strives," believes nature to possess an intrinsic 
value, and places a positive value on harmonizing human existence with nature. 
73 Ibid., p. 66. 
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world will show itself if we take that which is nearest to Dasein's way ofbeing as our 
interpretive clue in discovering worldliness. Heidegger thinks the surrounding world, id 
est, the environment, is the world that is closest for everyday Dasein, and, as such, will 
focus his analytic on how Dasein exists in the surrounding world. Heidegger writes: 
Our investigation will follow the path from this existential character of average 
being-in-the-world to the idea of worldliness as such. We shall seek the worldliness 
of the surrounding world ( environmentality [ umweltlichkeit]) by way of an 
ontological interpretation of those beings initially encountered within the 
d . 74 surroun mgs. 
2.5 
Heidegger wants to discover how Dasein encounters the world and the being of 
beings in our environment. We have found that our clue to encountering the world is to 
understand that which is nearest to Dasein's being-in-the-world. This section of my 
thesis will show that a world of use and production is nearest to Dasein and that Dasein 
encounters being through its dealings with useful things that are constituted through 
handiness. 
According to Heidegger, it is through the everyday dealings ofDasein with other 
innerworldly beings that Dasein understands the being of that which is in our 
environment. Dealings, rather than being grounded in a perceptual cognition, are 
grounded in "a handling, using, and taking care." 75 The phenomenological question 
currently at issue is the nature of"the being of those beings encountered when taking care 
74 Ibid. , p. 66. 
75 Ibid., p. 67. 
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of something."76 Entities encountered in production and use phenomenologically 
detennine the ontological structure ofbeing. In Dasein's concemful taking care of 
things, being is "what is used, produced."77 The way of being nearest to Dasein in its 
average everydayness is a concemful productive manipulation of things that sets beings 
to use. 
Whether use has a negative environmental connotation is not initially clear. In 
What is Called Thinking Heidegger describes the meaning of the original Greek word for 
"the useful": 
"To use" means, first, to let a thing be what it is and how it is. To let it be 
this way requires that the used thing be cared for in its essential nature -
we do so by responding to the demands which the used thing makes 
manifest in the given instance. 78 
"Using" does not mean the m ere utilizing, using up, exploiting. 
Utilization is only the degenerate and debauched form of use. When we 
handle a thing, for example, our hand must fit itself to the thing. Use 
implies fitting response. 79 
Thus, there is evidence that the kind of using Heidegger has in mind, which is 
constitutive of the way Dasein is primarily in the world, may be environmentally benign. 
However, since that which is nearest to Dasein in its average everydayness is a 
mode of dealing in the world that uses and produces, Being and Time, given my 
definition oftechnology, may prescribe a technological mode of being-in-the-world. 
76 Ibid., p. 67. 
77 Ibid., p. 67. 
78 Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking, translated by Fred D. Wieck & J . Glenn 
Gray, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 191. 
79 Ibid., p. 187. 
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Insofar as being is what is used and produced, rather than giving an environmental sense 
to being, Heidegger pragmatically understands being-in-the-world in a potentially 
technological way. An environmental understanding of the world does not prioritize the 
productive manipulation of things in the manner ofBeing and Time. Heidegger, in 
orienting his ontology through production and use, has given us reason to consider Being 
and Time inconsistent with environmentalism. 
To Heidegger, a using and handling is constitutive of Dasein. Everyday Dasein 
comports itself towards the world in terms ofuseful concerns and "always already is in 
this way."8° For example, when one opens a door, one uses the latch. Dasein orients 
itself in space through the usefulness of certain avenues for living. This pre-reflective 
and pre-theoretical pragmatic know-how through which Dasein always already operates 
in its world is the way that everyday Dasein exists in the world. 
Heidegger considers whether things are the beings that ought to serve as the 
preliminary theme of his investigation, but argues that one goes astray ontologically 
when one designates things to be "initially given." That which Dasein encounters initially 
is not a mere thing. As we have seen, things of nature and of value are insufficient for 
the question at issue. Heidegger thinks that the Greek tenn pragmata is an appropriate 
word for things and defines it as "that with which one has to do in taking care in 
80 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 67. 
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dealings."81 Given that Heidegger approves of the Greek term pragmata for things, we 
see a clear pragmatic element to Heidegger's ontology. 
Heidegger calls what we encounter in our concerns "Zeug" or "useful things." 
"Zeug" has the connotation of tool, and can also be translated as equipment, gear, or 
stuff I will refer to "Zeug" as equipment when it is more appropriate to the context. We 
primarily concern ourselves in our enviromnent with useful things, which are understood 
within the framework of work. As examples of useful things, "we find utensils for 
writing, utensils for sewing, utensils for working, driving, measuring. "82 Heidegger seeks 
to disclose the kind of being of a useful thing by uncovering the utility that makes a 
useful thing what it is. Since Dasein will relate to the enviromnent through using and 
manipulating nature insofar as equipment is what Dasein primarily encounters, useful 
things have a negative enviromnental significance. 
The being of a useful thing belongs to a totality of useful things and can be 
understood only in terms of this total context. An individual useful thing never shows 
itself by itself, but rather its individuality emerges from a total organization of useful 
things. Thus, Heidegger writes that "a totality of useful things is always already 
discovered before the individual useful thing."83 We first encounter a room "not as what 
81 Ibid., p. 68. 
82 Ibid., p. 68. 
83 Ibid., p. 69. 
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is 'between the four walls' in a geometrical, spatial sense, but rather as something useful 
for living."84 Out of this structure of use in its wholeness, Dasein orients itself in space. 
Useful things are essentially things that are "in-order-to." This in-order-to 
contains a structure of reference of something to something, and is a kind of reference 
according to which Dasein is assigned to its world. The dealings ofDasein "with useful 
things are subordinate to the manifold ofthe references of the 'in-order-to. '"85 Heidegger 
writes that "the different kinds of 'in order to' such as serviceability, helpfulness, 
usability, handiness, constitute a totality of useful things."86 Thus, the in-order-to is a 
pragmatic kind of reference. In dealing usefully with our surrounding world, our 
concerns subordinate themselves to the in-order-to constitutive of useful things. 
In Dasein's dealing with useful things such entities genuinely become what they 
are. For instance, a hammer reveals itself as what it is in hammering. Even though in 
using a hammer Dasein does not thematically grasp the hammer nor understand the 
structure of it as a useful thing, hammering "has appropriated this utensil in the most 
adequate way possible."87 Heidegger writes: "The less we just stare at the thing called 
hammer, the more we take hold of it and use it, the more original [ursprunglicher] our 
relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a 
useful thing."88 In using a hammer Dasein encounters it primordially as what it is, attains 
84 Ibid,. p. 68 
85 Ibid. , p. 69. 
86 Ibid., p. 68. 
87 Ibid., p. 69 
88 Ibid., p. 69. 
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a more appropriate relation towards the stuff of the environment, and uncovers the 
specific "handiness" of the hmmner. 
Handiness (readiness-to-hand)89 is the ontological term that signifies the being of 
a useful thing, and handiness is that in which a useful thing reveals itself as itself. 
Handiness translates "Zuhandenheit" which carries the connotation of what is "at hand," 
"ready-to-hand," and "available." It is when entities function in their use that useful 
things are handy and primordial. Handiness is the being-in-itself of useful things which 
allows them to be at our disposal. Dasein orients itself in the environment through the 
handiness that useful things show themselves to possess. Handiness, id est, the way 
Dasein knows how to use useful things in accordance with the in-order-to constitutive of 
its useful dealings, has priority to the extent that "things," insofar as we encounter them 
in our environment, are handy and pragmatic pieces of equipment. 
We have shown that Dasein's relation to the environment becomes more 
primordial through handily using useful things. However, for environmentalism, a 
primordial encounter with things does not arise, as with Being and Time, through the 
pragmatic using of handy beings, but occurs through an encounter with the nature that 
exists, in its untouched and pristine character, prior to the manipulation and use of the 
enviromnent. When a mountain, as such, is not used for quarry and a tree is not used for 
timber, one preserves the ecological value of such natural things. A tree or mountain is 
biologically and chronologically prior to timber or the quarry, and, as such, for 
89 In this chapter we will refer to readiness-to-hand as handiness in keeping with the 
terminology in the Stambaugh translation of Being and Time. 
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environmentalism, nature is itself prior to the handiness ofuseful things. However, 
Heidegger, by arguing that what Dasein first encounters is handiness and that the original 
way Dasein is in the world is a way that uses things, reverses the enviromnental 
conception in which nature in its untouched purity is prior to the handiness of things. In 
associating primordiality with handiness, Heidegger has given us a reason to judge Being 
and Time inconsistent with environmentalism. 
Circumspection is the sight through which Dasein deals with useful things in their 
handiness in accordance with the referentiality of the in-order-to. It is through 
circumspection, rather than through merely looking at the appearance of useful things or 
through theory, that one discovers handiness. The handy entity is not a theme for 
circumspection, but "withdraws, so to speak, in its character of handiness in order to be 
really handy."90 
Everyday dealings initially occupy themselves not with the tools, but with the 
work that is to be produced. Thus, the primary concern of the dealings of Dasein is the 
work to be produced. The work carries with it the referential-whole in which one 
encounters useful things, and "is what is primarily taken care of and is thus also what is at 
hand."91 The work produced has the same kind ofbeing as other useful things and is 
fundamentally something handy. Heidegger gives shoes and a clock as examples of what 
work is to be produced. Due to the nuanced nature of Being and Time, it is, as Dreyfus 
has noted, unclear whether the kind of production Heidegger has in mind is that of a more 
90 Ibid., p. 69. 
91 Ibid. , p. 69-70. 
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primitive fonn of production, such as craftsmanship, or a more industrial form of 
production, such as machine technology. 
The work produced is the what-for. The what-for of a hammer, for instance, may 
be the house or shelter for which it is used. In its concemful dealings, Dasein encounters 
the work such that it "always already lets us encounter the what-for of its usability in the 
usability which essentially belongs to it."92 The work exists "on the basis of use and the 
referential context ofbeings discovered in that use."93 Moreover, "the work that has been 
ordered exists in its tum only on the basis of its use."94 Thus, usefulness is the essential 
characteristic that determines the way in which a produced work exists. Given that use is 
the criterion determining what Dasein produces, environmental principles of conservation 
do not determine how Dasein produces. 
Productive work is useful for something, but it also uses a material for something. 
The work produced, therefore, contains a reference to the materials used. Hammers, 
tongs, and nails refer to "steel, iron, metal, stone, wood."95 Leather may serve as a 
material for production and it depends on hides, which depends on animals. In the case 
of animals, there are "beings accessible in the surrounding world which in themselves do 
not need to be produced and are always already at hand."96 
92 Ibid., p. 70. 
93 Ibid., p. 70. 
94 Ibid., p. 70. 
95 Ibid., p. 70. 
96 Ibid. , p. 70. 
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Dasein discovers nature through its productive involvement in a world ofwork in 
that nature gives itself as a product useful for useful things. Contrary to my notion of 
environmentalism, Heidegger writes that Dasein discovers nature "in the use of useful 
things, 'nature' in the light of products of nature."97 For Being and Time to be consistent 
with envirorunentalism, nature must have a status independent of production. If the only 
way Dasein can encounter nature is through its handiness for production, then we will 
have reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent with environmentalism. 
Nature, Heidegger notes, "must not be understood here as what is merely 
objectively present, nor as the power of nature."98 Heidegger understands nature as a raw 
material for human production: "the forest is a forest of timber, the mountain a quarry of 
rock, the river is water power, the wind is 'wind in the sails. "'99 Nature, therefore, is 
understood instrumentally within a technological framework 100 wherein nature exists as a 
handy raw material that stands on reserve for production. This instrumental conception 
of nature is not consistent with environmentalism because natural entities are understood 
to exist as technological resources serviceable to production and because nature has no 
value independent of its handiness for productive uses. 
97 Ibid., p. 70. 
98 Ibid., p. 70. 
99 Ibid., p. 70. 
100 It is possible that this conception of nature could be applicable to craftsmanship. 
However, in craftsmanship the forest is a forest in addition to being timber and the 
mountain is a mountain in addition to being quarry because nature has not been totally 
mobilized for production. Heidegger, in this conception of nature, depicts a total 
mobilization of nature for productive activities whereby the forest is timber and the 
mountain is quarry, and, thus, the conceptualization of nature at work in this part of 
Being and Time is technological. 
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Heidegger points out that nature can be theoretically understood, apart from its 
handiness, in its objective presence, but in this way one does not arrive at an ecological 
significance of nature. We have shown that there is an environmental connotation to 
objective presence. However, we again see that the conception of nature in objective 
presence is not an environmental understanding of nature, but is a categorical mode of 
theorizing. A botanist or geographer, in falling within the theoretical standpoint of 
objective presence, does not reveal the romanticized conception of nature that stimulates 
ecological understandings. The nature that, in the ecological sense, comes over us, "stirs 
and strives," and captivates us as landscape is not what is at issue in Being and Time as 
Heidegger understands nature through the lens of production. 
In addition to referring to its usability for something and what it consists of, 
productive work refers to the user. Dasein encounters the public world through 
productive activity, and this activity not only occurs in the isolated workshop, but also is 
present in the public world. In craft conditions, "the work is cut to his figure; he ' is' 
there as the work emerges."10 1 It is significant that Heidegger explicitly refers to 
craftsmanship, and, again, we see that it is not clear, in some ways, whether the kind of 
production in Being and Time refers to craftsmanship or technology. 
Dasein discovers the surrounding world of nature as it goes about its productive 
activity. Through production, nature is given a certain direction and the effort of 
producing useful things alleviates for Dasein the burdens of nature. Contrary to 
10 1 Ibid., p. 71. 
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environmentalism, the direction that nature possesses is not an intrinsic quality of nature, 
but arises from the circumspective awareness of the productivity through which nature is 
modelled. Heidegger writes: "In taking care, nature is discovered as having some 
definite direction on paths, streets, bridges, and buildings. A covered railroad platform 
takes bad weather into account, public lighting systems take darkness into account."102 
The absorption ofDasein in its nearest work-world serves a function of 
discovering. What Dasein discovers is innerworldly beings that are handy. Handiness 
does not colour beings that are initially objectively present, but, rather, handiness is 
initially encountered in beings and has priority over objective presence in how we deal 
with the world. The being "in-itself' of entities is ontologically and categorically 
determined as handiness. Thus, we again see that Heidegger privileges beings in their 
pragmatic - and potentially technological - use-functions. There is, contrary to 
enviromnentalism, no nature "in-itself' that we discover as entities pragmatically disclose 
themselves through handiness. 
Given the prioritization of handiness, we can reiterate that Heidegger understands 
objective presence to be a deficient mode ofbeing-in-the-world. Objective presence is a 
founded mode ofbeing-in-in-the-world, does not have priority in the discovery ofbeings, 
and is not initially encountered in beings. It is not inconsequential to the ends of this 
thesis that Heidegger determines a mode of being-in-the-world that refrains from use and 
production to be a deficiency. In directing his analysis towards a pragmatic 
102 Ibid., p. 71. 
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understanding of being-in-the-world in which Dasein handily orients itself among uses 
and production, Heidegger offers support for our hypothesis that Being and Time 
understands being-in-the-world within a technological horizon. 
Heidegger asks whether handiness is founded on objective presence insofar as 
that which is handy can be "only on the basis of what is objectively present."103 Given 
that the cognition associated with objective presence is a founded mode of being-in-the-
world, that Heidegger has associated handiness with primordiality, that handiness is the 
kind of being nearer to Dasein, and that handiness constitutes the ontological-categorical 
being-in-itself of entities, Heidegger clearly intends to show that objective presence is 
founded on handiness. Just as, for Heidegger, theory presupposes praxis, so too does 
objective presence presuppose handiness. Heidegger writes: 
But if, in our continuing ontological interpretation, handiness proves to be 
the kind of being of beings first discovered within the world, if its 
primordiality can ever be demonstrated over and against mere objective 
presence, does what we have explained up to now contribute in the least to 
an ontological understanding of the phenomenon of [the] world? 104 
We have shown that Heidegger favours pragmatic ways of understanding how 
Dasein is in the world. Dasein circumspectively orients itself in the world through using 
handy equipment and is concernfully absorbed in a world of production. Nature is 
understood technologically out of a context of production and use insofar as it functions 
as a raw material. Rather than espousing an environmental philosophy, our analysis of 
103 Ibid., p. 71. 
104 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Being and Time has shown that Heidegger pragmatically characterizes the being-in-the-
world ofDasein and understands nature technologically. 
2.6 
Heidegger's characterization of the environment proceeds by asking how it is we 
can arrive at the phenomenon of the world through the being of what we encounter in our 
useful dealings with innerworldly beings. Heidegger inquires into the possibility that 
there is, within the field ofDasein's productive work, a way innerworldly beings 
announce the worldly character of the surrounding world. It will be shown that certain 
modes of concern that disrupt Dasein's order of referentiality and make handiness 
unhandy lead into the phenomenon of the world. With regard to enviromnentalism, this 
section of my thesis will show that, as in a technological horizon, Dasein cannot 
encounter nature "in-itself' and worldliness arises out of a productive context. 
Heidegger asks us to consider "how ' is there' a world." 105 The world is 
determinative of im1erworldly beings and conditions the existence of innerworldly 
beings. Being-in-the-world is constitutive ofDasein, and, thus, the being ofDasein is 
essentially bound up with the world. Thus, Heidegger asks: 
Does not something like [the] world show itself to being-in-the-world 
taking care of the beings encountered within the world, that is, their 
im1erworldliness? Does not this phenomenon come into view pre-
phenomenologically; is it not always in view without requiring a 
thematically ontological interpretation? In the scope of its heedful 
absorption in useful things at hand, does not Dasein have a possibility of 
105 Ibid., p. 72. 
42 
being in which, together with the innerworldly beings taken care of, their 
worldliness is illuminated in a certain way? 106 
Heidegger is inquiring into a possibility through which the worldliness of the world 
illuminates itself amidst the handiness ofDasein's productive involvements. 
What are the modes of concern of everyday being-in-the-world, vis-a-vis 
handiness, in which the worldly character ofbeings shows itself? Heidegger examines 
three such modes of Dasein's concernful dealings - namely, conspicuousness, 
obtrusiveness, and obstinacy. Conspicuousness occurs when equipment is unusable, 
obtrusiveness occurs when equipment is missing, and obstinacy occurs when there is 
something that stands in the way ofDasein's doings with equipment. 
Conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy are all modes ofDasein's 
concernful dealings that bring out the objective presence in that which possesses 
handiness. Entities that are nonnally unproblematically absorbed within Dasein' s 
circumspection become objectively present when there are disruptions in the referential 
order in which one uses them. Since objective presence arises in a breakdown of our 
ordinary dealings, we again see that handiness has priority over objective presence and 
that objective presence must presuppose handiness. In becoming conspicuously, 
obtrusively, or obstinately objectively present, the equipment that is handy in our 
concerns becomes repulsive equipment that one would like to shove away. However, "in 
106 Ibid., p. 72. 
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this tendency to throw things away, what is at hand [handy] is still shown as being at 
hand [handy] in its unyielding objective presence."107 
Heidegger asks what "this reference to the modified way of encountering what is 
at hand, a way in which its objective presence is revealed, mean[s] for the clarification of 
the phenomenon of [the} world?"108 Heidegger concedes that we have not yet come 
substantially closer to the phenomenon of the world. Nonetheless, the disclosure of 
objective presence in certain handy modes of concern puts us in a position to bring the 
worldliness of the world into view. Conspicuous, obtrusive, and obstinate modes of 
being-in-the-world cause that which is handy to lose its handiness in a peculiar way. 
Handiness "does not just disappear, but bids farewell, so to speak, in the conspicuousness 
of what is unusable." 109 Handiness, as it were, still shows itself in its absence and in this 
way "the worldly character of what is at hand [handy] also shows itself." 110 The worldly 
character of handiness shows itself in the unusable nature of handiness. 
When a useful thing has no application and does not tum handily to our concerns, 
"the constitutive reference of the in-order-to to a what-for has been disrupted."111 In such, 
"a disruption of reference - in being unusable for. .. - the reference becomes explicit."112 
Conspicuous, obtrusive, and obstinate modes of concern are disruptions in which a 
reference becomes explicit such that the "what-for" becomes visible. Dasein catches 
107 Ibid., p. 74. 
108 Ibid., p. 74. 
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sight of that towards which its productive work aims, and the whole workshop, which is 
that wherein Dasein concernfully dwells, shows itself. When the whole workshop 
becomes visible, "the context of useful things is lit up, not as a totality never seen before, 
but as a totality that has continually been seen beforehand in our circumspection. But 
with this totality, [the] world makes itselfknown." 113 
Thus, the world announces itself through the circumspective awareness of the 
total context of useful things that lights up in a referential disturbance. Rather than being 
a kind of enviromnental insight into the world, one sees that the world discloses itself out 
of the horizon ofDasein's equipmental involvement within a production workshop. 
Since worldliness arises out of the "lighting up" of a totality of equipment, the disclosure 
of the world is fundamentally technological. 
For that which is at hand to be encountered in its handiness and "being-in-itself," 
the referentiality in which Dasein is absorbed must remain unthematized for 
circumspection. Thus, "the condition for the possibility of what is at hand not emerging 
from its inconspicuousness is that the world not announce itself." 114 If that which is 
handy is to remain inconspicuous and genuinely be handy, then the world must be in the 
unthematized background ofDasein's concerns. The non-announcement of the world of 
handy inconspicuous beings constitutes the phenomenal structure of the "being-in-itself' 
of beings in their handiness. Inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and non-obstinacy all 
11 3 Ibid., p. 75. 
11 4 Ibid., p. 75. 
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refer to a positive phenomenal characteristic of the being of that which is handy. They 
"express the character of keeping to itself of what is at hand." 115 
Insofar as inconspicuousness, unobtrusiveness, and non-obstinacy are conditions 
in which Dasein is unproblematically absorbed in the handiness of production and insofar 
as each is a positive phenomenal characteristic of the being-in-itself of things, we see that 
Heidegger prioritizes a handy way of being that produces. Moreover, the breakdown in 
the ability of Dasein to handily use equipment for productive purposes is a deficient 
mode of being-in-the-world, and we see that Dasein cannot encounter nature "in-itself' as 
the only way to relate to the environment is through handily using useful things. 
We have shown that Heidegger arrives at the phenomenon of the world through 
the involvements of Dasein in a world of production. The particular modes of concern 
that make handiness unhandy and the circumspective awareness of the total workshop 
that arises from a referential disruption announce the phenomenon of the world. The 
route by which worldliness is illuminated in Being and Time is not through an 
environmental understanding, but arises out of the handiness of a context of production-
equipment. Moreover, Dasein cannot encounter nature "in-itself' apart from its 
productive practices in a world of handiness. 
2.7 
We will now investigate the nature of signs so as to clarify the pragmatic nature 
of Being and Time. We will examine the bearing of signs on handiness and the world, 
11 5 Ibid., p. 75. 
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and we will show that the being of a sign is rooted in use. Furthermore, we will disclose 
the nature of signs in the primitive world. 
Heidegger gives an ontological analysis of references through signs. Signs are 
interpreted to be useful things, and their "specific character as useful things consists of 
indicating."116 The specific example of a sign Heidegger uses is the adjustable arrow on a 
motor-car that indicates the direction the car will travel. The car arrow is understood 
pragmatically as a sign "handy within the world in the totality of the context of useful 
things belonging to vehicles and traffic regulations." 11 7 We discover the car arrow and 
other signs not as mere things that occur, but through circumspectly encountering handy 
equipment. 
Heidegger pragmatically explains the ontological structure of signs: "As 
indicating, 'referring' is rather grounded in the structure ofbeing of useful things, in 
serviceability-for." 11 8 Serviceability-for, as the structure ofuseful things, ontologically 
grounds the referring of a sign. Heidegger states that "the 'referral' of indicating is the 
ontic concretion ofthe what-for of serviceability, and detennines a useful thing for that 
what-for." 11 9 In pragmatic fashion, serviceability-for is ontologically and categorically 
determinative of useful things. 
Signs let Dasein encounter the handiness of the environment in a way that secures 
an orientation for Dasein's dealings in the world. Signs "are useful things which 
11 6 Ibid., p. 77. 
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explicitly bring a totality of useful things to circumspection so that the worldly character 
o_fwhat is at hand makes itself known at the same time."120 Thus, signs make the world 
explicit within an environment that is pragmatically handy. 
Signs do not have to come into being through the production of a useful thing 
such as a car arrow. In addition, "signs also originate when something already at hand is 
taken as a sign."121 In such cases a more primordial meaning is evident, and signs 
discover something. When the south wind, for instance, "is 'accepted' by the farmer as a 
sign of rain, this 'acceptance' or the 'value attached' to this being is not a kind of bonus 
attached to something already objectively present, that is, the movement of the wind and 
a certain geographical direction."122 The mere objective presence of the south wind does 
not establish the sign for rain. On the contrary, the south wind becomes recognized as a 
sign through its handiness as "the fanner's circumspection first discovers the south wind 
in its being by taking the lay of the land into account."123 Thus, we see that, rather than 
reading a sign through an ecological insight into nature "in-itself," Dasein understands 
signs through handiness. 
We have seen that signs occur in the pragmatic context of the handiness ofuseful 
things, but can there be signs without this emphasis on utility and handiness? Indeed, 
there can be. Heidegger explores the nature of signs, such as magic and fetishism, among 
primitive Dasein. Primitives do not establish their signs through theoretical speculations 
120 Ibid., p. 80. 
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and their "use of signs remains completely within an 'immediate' being-in-the-world." 124 
For primitives, "the sign coincides with what it indicates ... the sign itself always is what 
is indicated." 125 The sign is not free from what it indicates as no detachment of the sign 
from what it indicates is possible. This coincidence of the sign with what is indicated 
does not "mean that the sign-thing has already undergone a certain 'objectification,' that 
it has been experienced as a mere thing and been transposed together with what is 
signified to the same region of being of objective presence."126 Rather this coincidence of 
sign and indication in the primitive world is based on the total lack of possible 
objectification, and this impossibility of a sign becoming objectified "means that signs 
are not at all discovered as useful things, that ultimately what is 'at hand ' in the world 
does not have the kind of being of useful things at all ."127 Hence, Heidegger writes, 
"perhaps this ontological guideline (handiness and useful things), too, can provide 
nothing for an interpretation of the primitive world, and certainly for an ontology of 
thingliness."128 Thus, the way of life in the primitive world does not discover signs as 
useful things and may not be rooted in handiness. 
The inquiry of Heidegger into the usage of signs among primitive peoples reveals 
a kind ofbeing-in-the-world that is consistent with environmentalism. The primitive 
world is fundamentally environmental in that it is not oriented towards production and 
does not reduce nature to the handiness of its uses. As against the pragmatic and 
I 
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technological determination of average everyday Dasein, the primitive world is not 
understandable through useful things and may not be oriented by handiness. In "letting 
be" the untouched nature of natural beings rather than excessively using nature, the 
primitive world is evidence that there is an original way to be in the world that 
harmonizes with nature. 
One would think it obvious that a primitive way of being can be associated with 
primordiality as both would appear to be original ways of being. However, the 
conception of primordiality that Heidegger adopts contradicts Heidegger's own position 
that "primitive Dasein often speaks out of a more primordial [ ursprunglichen] absorption 
in 'phenmnena."'129 Heidegger cannot consistently claim that primitives are primordial 
because, on the one hand, handiness is the kind of being that is primordial, and, on the 
other hand, primitives may not orient their being through handiness. It would seem then 
that in identifying primordiality with handiness Heidegger contravenes the possibility of 
identifying the primitive understanding ofbeing-in-the-world with primordiality. 
The conceptualization of signs that Heidegger develops is consistent with his 
pragmatic privileging of beings in their useful handiness. Signs are useful things that 
possess handiness in their being and serviceability-for is the ontological structure of 
signs. Although it is not through some ecological insight that average everyday Dasein 
understands signs, in the primitive world there exists an environmental way of being in 
which signs are not understood as useful things. 
129 Ibid., p. 51. 
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2.8 
We will now aim to disclose the nature of relevance, what is meant by the "letting 
be" of beings, the nature of significance, and how Heidegger describes the worldliness of 
the world. In regards to environmentalism, we will show that Heidegger understands the 
suitability ofbeings through use, understands relevance within a context of uses, 
establishes a way in which Dasein "lets be," and conceives of the structure of 
significance constitutive ofworldliness within a framework ofhandiness. 
Handiness, as the being of the beings encountered at hand in the world, is 
"ontologically related to the world and to worldliness."130 The world is essentially "there" 
in things that are handy, and is discovered unthematically prior to the discovery of things 
we encounter. In certain ways that we deal with our surrounding world, the world can 
appear since it is that through which handiness is handy. The world lets handiness be 
encountered, and what we encounter is, as it were, released and given free rein in its 
being for our circumspection. Heidegger asks what this freeing means and in what way it 
is ontologically distinctive for the world. 
Handiness and useful things are constituted through reference. Specific kinds of 
reference include serviceability for, impainnent, and usability. References can become 
concrete through "the what-for of serviceability and wherefore ofusability." 13 1 The 
qualities of things at hand are bound up with their suitability or unsuitability for certain 
uses in the same way that objective presence is bound up with handiness. Moreover, "as 
130 Ibid., p. 83. 
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the constitution of useful things, serviceability (reference) is also not the suitability of 
beings, but the condition of the possibility of being for their being able to be detennined 
by suitability."132 Thus, serviceability is the condition with regard to being that enables 
an entity to be suitable for something. Insofar as serviceability can be likened to 
usability, uses are determinative of the suitability of something for something, and we, 
thus, again see that pragmatic considerations determine what is appropriate. 
Reference is a condition of the possibility of something being handy and useful. 
Since reference is a structure of the being of handy things, things "have in themselves the 
character of being referred."133 One discovers beings as being referred to something, and 
in their being referred to something beings possess "relevance" for something. 
What is relevance? Relevance can be likened to an involvement. Relevance lets 
something be "together with" something and is the character of being that belongs to 
handiness. Relevance is the being ofbeings in the world and through it innerworldly 
beings are always already freed. Relevance is an "ontological detennination of the being 
of these beings." 134 Something is relevant to its use insofar as it is serviceable or usable 
for its use. Thus, relevance concerns the pragmatic usefulness of something for certain 
ends such as "the what-for of serviceability, the wherefore of applicability." 135 
Hammering, for instance, can be relevant in terms of the what-for insofar as it is 
serviceable to fastening an area to protect against bad weather. This relevance is one that 
132 Ibid., p. 83. 
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Heidegger insists is for a possibility ofDasein's being, and, thus, relevance, in addition to 
being grounded in use, is grounded on an existential structure. 
An individual handy thing is always relevant in terms of a totality of relevance 
and the totality of relevance is prior to the relevance of an individual thing. Thus, the 
"relevance things at hand have is prefigured in terms of the total relevance."136 The total 
relevance which "constitutes the things at hand in a workshop in their handiness is 
'earlier' than any single useful thing, as is the farmstead with all its utensils and 
neighboring lands." 13 7 
Relevance, in being outlined in advance through a totality of relevance, refers 
back to an original what-for that has no further relevance. Thus, the total relevance 
"ultimately leads back to a what-for which no longer has relevance, which itself is not a 
being of the kind ofbeing of things at hand within a world, but is a being whose being is 
defined as being-in-the-world, to whose constitution ofbeing worldliness itself 
belongs." 138 The what-for ultimately leads back to a "for-the-sake-of-which." Heidegger 
writes that "the for-the-sake-of-which always concerns the being of Dasein which is 
essentially concerned about this being itself in its being." 139 Relevance and the what-for 
are founded on the being ofDasein in its worldly and existential "for-the-sake-of-which." 
Heidegger ontologically interprets the phenomenon of"letting be." He writes that 
"to let something be relevant means to let things at hand be in such and such a way in 
136 Ibid., p. 84. 
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factical taking care of things, to let them be as they are and in order that they be such."140 
The on tic meaning of this "letting be" is to be interpreted ontologically. Onto logically 
understood, "letting something be relevant is the previous freeing of beings for their 
innerworldly handiness."141 To "let be" is not to produce or bring beings into being, but 
to discover that which already is within the handiness of a context of use. To "let be" 
ontologically in tenns of relevance "concerns the freeing of every thing at hand as a thing 
at hand, whether it is relevant in the ontic sense or whether it is such a being which is 
precisely not relevant ontically." 142 A being that is not relevant ontically is one that we do 
not "let be," but rather work upon, improve, or smash. "Letting be" is an a priori perfect 
tense in which Dasein discovers that which is already in being and lets ontical beings be 
relevant in tenns of its handy dealings in the world. 
Our analysis has inclined towards a criticism of the pragmatic and technological 
dimensions of Being and Time out of a concern for environmental integrity. However, 
the notion of"letting be" may be a redemptive idea from the standpoint of 
environmentalism. In what sense, then, is the "let be" of Heideggerian fundamental 
ontology a principle consistent with enviromnentalism? 
"Letting be" is not consistent with the radical fonns of environmentalism that, as 
with the primitive world, insist on the abandonment of most fonns of handiness and use 
from an environmental way of life. There is no better way to "let be" than to refrain, as 
140 Ibid., p. 84. 
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in objective presence, from the use and manipulation of the environment. That 
Heidegger understands "letting be" in terms of handiness suggests that Heidegger does 
not realize that an orientation towards the world in terms of useful things will lead to the 
excessive exploitation of nature. Insofar as "letting be" refers to a relevant context of use 
and handiness, Heidegger, in "letting be," remains within a pragmatic framework in 
which Dasein manipulates nature. IfHeidegger had rather applied his principle of 
"letting be" to a nature that "stirs and strives," then Heidegger would potentially be 
consistent with all forms of environmentalism. 
"Letting be" does not produce, but allows Dasein to discover what already is. In 
such a notion, there is an enviromnental principle of reduction and of conservation that 
renders Heidegger, in a sense, consistent with enviromnentalism. Rather than exercising 
a greater technological dominance over nature, in "letting be" Dasein "reduces" 
production and thereby "reduces" enviromnental exploitation. Furthennore, in letting 
beings be what they are, "letting be" "conserves" the beings ofDasein's environment in a 
way parallel to the demand of environmentalists to conserve nature. In that it reduces 
production and conserves beings, " letting be" is consistent with enviromnentalism. 
"Letting be," on the one hand, embodies enviromnental principles of reduction 
and conservation, but, on the other hand, it applies to the handiness ofDasein's concerns 
in which Dasein uses the enviromnent. On the whole, however, we can say that the 
environmental credentials of"letting be" outweigh its non-enviromnental credentials. 
"Letting be" is a principle that ambiguously offers support for environmentalism. 
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Enviromnentalism can be made consistent with forms ofbeing-in-the-world that 
minimize the extent to which Dasein produces. Although what Dasein "lets be" are 
handy useful things, the way in which Dasein uses the enviromnent and the way in which 
it is handy has been qualified by the principle of"letting be" such that Dasein conserves 
beings and, through refraining from production, reduces the extent to which one exploits 
nature. Hence, though not a robust enviromnental principle, "letting be" minimizes the 
extent ofDasein's use of the enviromnent in a way consistent with enviromnentalism. 
To Heidegger, a relevant being that Dasein "lets be" is discovered concemfully as 
a being that is always already handy in Dasein's surroundings, and is not merely 
objectively present. Dasein does not first encounter things as mere things, but initially 
encounters the handiness of the "thing." Thus, "when a being shows itself in general to 
heedfulness, that is, when a being is discovered in its being, it is always already a thing at 
hand [handy] in the surrounding world and precisely not ' initially' merely present 'world-
stuff. "'143 
Dasein, writes Heidegger, "has been referred to an in-order-to in tenns of an 
explicitly or inexplicitly grasped potentiality-for-being for the sake of which it is, which 
can be authentic or inauthentic." 144 This in-order-to prefigures a what-for as something 
that can be relevant in and with something. On the basis of its potentiality for being, a 
what-for arises "as the possible letting something be relevant which structurally allows 
143 Ibid., p. 85. 
144 Ibid., p. 86. 
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for relevance to something else."145 Dasein is always "already referred in terms of a for-
the-sake-of-which to the with-what of relevance."146 Dasein refers itself from a for-the-
sake-of-which to relevance in such a way that Dasein always already "lets beings be 
encountered as things at hand [handy]."147 
Heidegger writes, "that within which Dasein understands itselfbeforehand in the 
mode of self-reference is that for which it lets beings be encountered beforehand."148 The 
world is that within which Dasein understands itself, and, is, thus, that for which it lets 
beings be encountered. Moreover, "as that for which one lets beings be encountered in 
the kind of being of relevance, the wherein of self-referential understanding is the 
phenomenon of [the} world. "149 The world is the "within" for the sake of which Dasein 
lets beings be encountered, and the structure wherein Dasein is referred is constitutive of 
the worldliness of the world. 
Dasein understands itself in tenus of a primordial familiarity that is existential and 
is essential to Dasein's understanding ofbeing. The meaning of this familiarity with the 
world in its worldliness can only be clarified on the basis of a primordial ontological 
interpretation ofDasein's being, Dasein's possibilities, and being in general. It is 
possible that Heidegger may have intended to develop, as opposed to the preliminary 
average everyday ontology of the world, a primordial ontology of the world that is 
145 Ibid., p. 86. 
146 Ibid., p. 86. 
147 Ibid., p. 86. 
148 Ibid., p. 86. 
149 Ibid., p. 86. 
57 
consistent with environmentalism. However, because Heidegger associates primordiality 
with the handiness that uses useful things for production, and because, as we shall show, 
Heidegger associates primordiality with handy relations of significance in a context of 
relevance, there are substantive reasons to believe a primordial ontology of the world will 
not coincide with an environmental philosophy. 
In its familiar relevance, Dasein moves within its frame of reference according to 
the disclosure that its understanding holds before itself. In its familiarity with relations, 
Dasein "signifies" to itself, and, moreover, "primordially gives itself to understand its 
being and potentiality-of-being with regard to its being-in-the-world."150 The activity of 
Dasein occurs on the basis of relations of significations: "The for-the-sake-of-which 
signifies an in-order-to, the in-order-to signifies a what-for, the what-for signifies a what-
in ofletting something be relevant, and the latter a what-with ofrelevance."151 
Significance is the relational totality of these significations that forms a primordial 
totality and a priori signifies Dasein's understanding ofbeing-in-the-world. The structure 
of the world is constituted by significance, and the significance disclosed in these 
relations is an existential characteristic of Dasein. The context of relations, which is 
constitutive, as significance, of references, can be formally understood as a system of 
relations in the sense of relationships in which concemful circumspection dwells. 
Heidegger writes that "in its familiarity with significance Dasein is the antic 
condition of the possibility of the discovery of beings with the kind of being of relevance 
150 Ibid., p. 87. 
15 1 Ibid., p. 87. 
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(handiness) which are encountered in a world and that thus can make themselves known 
in their in-itself "152 Dasein is the condition of the possibility of discovering relevant and 
handy beings. As a being of significance, Dasein "always means that a context of things 
at hand [handy] is already essentially discovered with its being."153 Thus, we see that the 
significance constitutive of worldliness necessarily understands Dasein in a world of 
handiness. Insofar as Dasein is, it has always already been referred to a handy world in 
tenns of significance. Moreover, "as the existential constitution of Dasein, of its being-
in-the-world, this disclosed significance is the ontic condition of the possibility for 
discovering a totality ofrelevance."154 
Heidegger has delineated three kinds of being that must be kept distinct. First, 
Heidegger has shown the being of beings encountered in their handiness, and, second, he 
has shown the being of beings encountered in their objective presence. Lastly, Heidegger 
has shown "the being of the ontic condition of the possibility of discovering innerworldly 
beings in general, the worldliness ofthe world." 155 The worldliness of the world is an 
existential determination of Dasein qua being-in-the-world that makes it possible in the 
first place for beings to be discovered. 
Thus, we see that Heidegger differentiates handiness as a way of being from 
worldliness. Dasein and the worldliness of the world are both conditions of the 
possibility of something being handy that, owing to their existential and ontological 
152 Ibid., p. 87. 
153 Ibid., p. 87. 
154 Ibid., p. 87. 
155 Ibid., p. 88. 
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nature, are not founded on uses and handiness. However, as we have already seen in 
Dreyfus' analysis, 156 there is reason to believe that Heidegger conflates handiness with 
the worldliness of the world. 
Although Heidegger thinks the worldliness of the world must be understood in 
distinction from handiness, the structure of the world is constituted by a significance that 
always already reveals the world to be handy. The worldliness of the world is itself 
found to be a structure of handiness. The in-order-to and what-for, as significations that 
constitute the structure of worldliness, are pragmatic references that pertain to use and 
production. Thus, the significance constitutive of the world reveals worldliness to be a 
world of handiness, and Heidegger conflates a handy mode ofbeing-in-the-world with 
the worldliness of the world. To encounter something within the worldliness of the 
world, it must fit within the equipmental schema of a referential totality understood 
through handiness. 
We have shown that the ontological character of beings in their handiness is 
relevance, that in "letting be" one frees beings in their relevant handiness, that the world 
is that for which Dasein lets entities be encountered in their relevance, and that the 
worldliness of the world consists of significance. With regards to environmentalism, our 
analysis of Being and Time has shown that use is predominant within Heidegger's 
ontology insofar as serviceability determines the suitability of things and we have seen 
that Dasein, in its relevance and significance, always already discovers "things" as handy. 
156 See page 18-19 of Chapter One. 
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We have seen that Dasein and the worldliness of the world are founded on an existential 
way of being that is itself identical with a handy mode of being, and we have seen that in 
"letting be" Dasein relates to its environment in a way that is ambiguously 
enviromnental. 
2.9 
This section of my thesis will inquire into the status of nature in Being and Time. 
Heidegger writes: 
"Nature," which "surrounds" us, is indeed an innerworldly being, but it 
shows neither the kind of being of handiness, nor of objective presence as 
"natural things." In whatever way one interprets this being of "nature," all 
modes of being of innerworldly beings are ontologically founded in the 
worldliness of the world, and thus in the phenomenon ofbeing-in-the-
world.157 
Nature is not a being that is handy or objectively present, and must be understood through 
the worldliness of the world and the phenomenon ofbeing-in-the-world. We have shown 
that Dasein encounters nature through handiness, but, given the above quote, it would 
seem that Dasein does not encounter nature solely through the handiness of productive 
engagements. 
Heidegger, on the one hand, acknowledges nature not to be handy. Yet, on the 
other hand, Heidegger reveals the worldliness of the world, through which nature is 
understood, to be constituted by the handiness of relevant relationships of significance. 
Given that worldliness itself always reveals the world to be handy and is composed of 
157 Ibid., p. 211. 
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pragmatic significations- such as the in-order-to and what-for- the understanding of 
nature that arises from the worldliness of the world remains within the parameters of 
handiness. A worldly understanding of nature will not be distinct from a handy 
understanding of nature. 
2.10 
This section of our thesis will show how Heidegger intends us to understand the 
average everyday description ofbeing-in-the-world in which Dasein uses, produces, 
and manipulates its environment. We will tum to a passage of Being and Time that 
indicates the way in which we are to understand the pragmatic average everyday mode 
ofbeing-in-the-world. Heidegger intends the average everyday mode ofbeing-in-the-
world that uses and produces to be positive. However, in addition to being positive, 
does Heidegger understand the pragmatic mode of being-in-the-world to be authentic? 
That Dasein deals with the world through use and production may be descriptive of 
Dasein, but not something that Heidegger prescribes for Dasein's authentic being. The 
question, which will demonstrate Heidegger's environmental integrity, simply becomes 
whether the average everyday description of being-in-the-world has an authentic 
significance. 
Heidegger writes: 
As examples of the phenomena of being together with ... we chose the 
using, handling, and producing of things at hand and their deficient and 
undifferentiated modes, that is, the being together with things that belong 
to everyday need. The authentic existence of Dasein also maintains itself 
in such taking care, even when it remains "indifferent" for it. 158 
158 Ibid., p. 352. 
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The authentic existence of Dasein maintains itself in the concemful taking care that 
uses, handles, and produces handy things. Heidegger has certainly worded his 
understanding of use and production in a more favourable light given that using and 
producing are done in the service of need. However, this quote makes it clear that 
there is no modification of the handy inauthentic using and producing of equipment 
whereby one authentically relates to the environment in an environmental way. 
Though one may be indifferent to the using and producing of things, there is no avenue 
out of a pragmatic horizon for Dasein in Being and Time insofar as a way of being that 
uses and produces remains authentic. 
There is a certain falleness that characterizes the description of the being-in-
the-world of Dasein. Thus, through a change of emphasis one can argue that the point 
is not so much that using and producing is authentic. Rather, authentic Dasein remains 
fallen and, hence, unable to change a condition of use and production. However, the 
point remains that Heidegger does not prescribe an environmental way of relating to 
the enviromnent for the authentic being of Dasein. The authentic existence of Dasein 
does not relate to nature in a way distinct from an average everyday way ofbeing-in-
the-world. Whether this reflects the fallen status of Dasein does not change the fact 
that Heidegger has conjoined a non-environmental way of being-in-the-world with the 
authentic being of Dasein. The pragmatic using of nature for productive ends is 
coextensive with an authentic mode of being-in-the-world, and, thus, we have further 
reason to judge Being and Time inconsistent with enviromnentalism. 
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2.11 
Our elucidation of Being and Time has significantly clarified whether the 
philosophy of Martin Heidegger in Being and Time is consistent with environmentalism. 
The notion of"letting be" is the only aspect of Being and Time that we have found to be 
in any way consistent with enviromnentalism. The bulk of our evidence indicates that 
Being and Time does not present an environmental philosophy as it pragmatically 
understands being-in-the-world through an orientation among uses and production. 
Furthermore, there is support for our hypothesis that Being and Time situates being-in-
the-world within a technological horizon that is inconsistent with environmentalism. A 
final synthesis of the consistency of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in Being and 
Time with enviromnentalism will await our fourth chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
3.1 
This chapter of my thesis will evaluate more of the scholarly literature pertaining 
to the question ofwhether Being and Time is consistent with environmentalism. We will 
look at three philosophers - Joseph Fell, Paul Farwell, and W. S. K. Cameron - and 
detennine in what sense these scholars support my hypothesis that Being and Time 
understands the world within a technological horizon that is inconsistent with 
environmentalism. 
We will first tum to the work of Joseph P. Fell. Fell defends Heidegger' s 
environmental integrity. Nature, Fell suggests, is not merely understood through 
readiness-to-hand in a derivative and deficient way. To Fell, anxiety discloses a present-
at-hand (objectively present) primordial nature that has priority over a ready-to-hand 
(handy) nature. Our analysis will show that, contrary to environmentalism, the only 
disclosure of nature in Being and Time is through the ready-to-hand as anxiety does not 
disclose a present-at-hand nature. 
Fell shows that it was a matter of concern to Heidegger that Being and Time was 
given a pragmatic and technological interpretation. To Heidegger, Being and Time 
attempted .. . 
.. . a first characterization of the phenomenon of the world through an 
interpretation of how we move about first and for the most part in our 
world everyday. In so doing, I started with what is ready-to-hand for us 
everyday, what we use and manage ... The point was to press on, by and 
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through this first characterization ofthe phenomenal world, to an 
exhibition of the phenomenon of world as a problem. But it was never my 
intention to assert or establish through this interpretation that the essence 
of man consists in his wielding a spoon and fork and riding on the 
streetcar. 159 
Heidegger, thus, warns us "against misinterpreting the equipment analysis of Division I 
of Being and Time as claiming that the human being is essentially a practical user of 
practical instruments." 160 However, admittedly, Heidegger also states that "we have to 
clarify for ourselves what it signifies that man has a relation to the works that he 
produces. It is for this reason that a certain book called Sein und Zeit discusses dealings 
with equipment."161 Thus, there may be an intrinsic reason underlying the pragmatic 
orientation of Being and Time. 
Moreover, Heidegger, in the above quote about "wielding a spoon and fork," does 
not admit the extent to which a pragmatic mode of being-in-the-world has been 
"essentialized." The analysis of Being and Time reveals the pragmatic use of equipment 
to play a crucial role in the average everyday and authentic mode of being of Dasein. To 
reiterate: Using and producing is the kind of being nearest to Dasein; being is what is 
159 Martin Heidegger, Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik, in Martin Heidegger: 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 29, (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostennann, 1983), p. 262-3. 
(In Joseph Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in the Early 
Heidegger," in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, edited by Hubert Dreyfus & Harrison Hall, 
[Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1992], p.66). 
160 Joseph Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange: On the Limits of Praxis in the Early 
Heidegger," in Heidegger: A Critical Reader, edited by Hubert Dreyfus & Harrison Hall, 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), p. 66. 
16 1 Martin Heidegger, Aristotle 's Metaphysics, 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of 
Force, translated by W. Brogan and P. Warne, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1995), p. 11 7. (In Andrew Feenberg, Heidegger and Marcuse: The 
Catastrophe and Redemption of History, p. xiv). 
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used and produced; 'pragmata ' is the appropriate word for things; Dasein relates 
primordially to the environment through the handiness of uses; Dasein understands nature 
through its instrumental handiness; signs are understood pragmatically; and the 
significance constitutive of the structure of the world always already discovers the world 
to be handy. Since Dasein is, even in its authentic being, constituted by handy 
involvements with equipment, we find it hard not to conclude that Dasein "essentially" 
operates in the world in a pragmatic way. 
Fell tells us that the pragmatic analysis of Being and Time was only a first 
characterization based on "how we 'first and for the most part' (zunachst and zumeist) 
comport ourselves in everydayness." 162 Fell stresses that the pragmatic mode ofbeing-in-
the-world described in Division One is an average everyday interpretation that is 
preliminary, and remarks that "the interpreter of Being and Time must be careful not to 
conflate what is 'first and for the most part' with what is 'fundamental' or 'primordial' 
(ursprunglich)."163 However, this interpretation is problematic because, in addition to 
being the positive mode of being through which Heidegger hopes to access the meaning 
of being, the average everyday way Dasein uses equipment is primordial and not distinct 
from an authentic mode of being. Thus, there is something "fundamental" about what is 
"first and for the most part." 
Fell refers us to a passage in Heidegger's "The Essence of Reasons" that attempts 
to vindicate the approach of Being and Time to the environment: 
162 Joseph Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange," p. 66. 
163 Ibid., p. 66. 
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If we somehow equate the ontical system ofuseful things (of tools) with 
the world and explain being in the world as traffic with useful things, we 
then abandon any understanding of transcendence as being in the world in 
the sense of a "basic constitutive feature ofDasein." 
On the other hand, a study of the ontological structure of"environmental" 
being (in so far as it is discovered as tool) has one singular advantage for a 
preliminary characterization of world: it leads over to an analysis of this 
phenomenon and prepares the way for the transcendental problem of the 
world. As is indicated clearly enough in the outline and arrangement of 
sections 14-24 of Being and Time, this is the sole intention of the analysis 
of envirorunent, which itself, considered in tenns of the guiding aim of the 
book remains subordinate. 
There are reasons why the concept "nature" seems to be missing in the 
Analytic ofDasein- not only "nature" in a primordial sense (cf. Sein und 
Zeit, p. 65 et infi'a). The decisive reason is that we encounter nature 
neither within the compass of the envirorunent [Umwelt] nor in general 
primarily as something to which we relate ourselves. Nature is 
primordially manifest in Dasein because Dasein exists as situated and 
disposed [als bejindlich-gestimmtes] in the midst ofbeings. But only in so 
far as situatedness (thrownness) belongs to the essence ofDasein and is 
expressed in the unity of the full concept of care can we attain the basis 
for the problem of nature. 164 
Thus, the pragmatic approach to the envirorunent in Being and Time was a merely 
preliminary detennination that leads into the transcendental problem of the world. 
Nature, moreover, is absent from Being and Time because Dasein does not encounter 
nature in the envirorunent. Only through the concept of care does one attain the ground 
for the problem of nature. Heidegger states that the pragmatic characterization of the 
envirorunent is "subordinate" to the guiding aim of Being and Time, but, as we have 
noted, the preliminary pragmatic characterization of the world has a primordial and 
authentic implication. Heidegger's qualification does not change the extent to which a 
pragmatic mode ofbeing-in-the-world is definitive ofDasein. 
164 Martin Heidegger "Yom Wesen des Grundes," in Wegmarken, in Martin Heidegger: 
Gesamtausgabe, Vol. 9 (Frankfurt-am-Main: Vittorio Klostennann, 1976), pp. 155-6. (In 
Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange," p. 66-67). 
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Fell states what we find problematic about Being and Time: "The 'preliminary' 
characterization of world in Being and Time has not done justice to the relation of world 
and nature. (The oft-noted infrequency of the term 'earth' in Being and Time seems one 
sign of the incompleteness of that book's treatment of the being ofnature.)"165 Moreover, 
the prioritization of the ready-to-hand implies nature has a derivative and deficient status: 
If one starts philosophically with Dasein's everyday preoccupation with 
practical equipment, one reaches nature as such only secondarily, by a 
derivation or shift of focus that brings presentness-at-hand to the fore ... So 
it can appear to the interpreter of Being and Time that nature is a 
derivative phenomenon and a deficient phenomenon, dependent for its 
being on the prior showing of an apparently primordial readiness-to-
hand.1 66 
Fell denies the "derivative" and "deficient" status of nature in Being and Time. To Fell, 
readiness-to-hand is not primordial and the average everyday use of the environment is 
not authentic. Fell states: "Heidegger never says that readiness-to-hand is 'primordial; ' it 
is the kind ofbeing that is experienced ' first and for the most part' in 'average 
everydayness,' which is a ' fallen' and 'inauthentic' experience."167 However, I have 
shown that readiness-to-hand is primordial and that an authentic mode of being maintains 
itself in the world in a way that handily produces in tenns of the average everyday way 
Dasein is "first and for the most part." 
Fell argues that the familiar everyday comportment of Dasein among pragmatic 
instruments is a limited aspect of being-in-the-world. An understanding of nature can 
165 Joseph Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange," p. 67. 
166 Ibid., p. 67 0 
167 Ibid., p. 67. 
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move beyond the "limits of praxis" through a disclosure of the strange. Nature is 
primordially in Dasein because of the "situated and disposed" character ofDasein. Thus, 
an analysis ofthe disposition ofDasein will lead into "Heidegger's account ofthe 
disclosure of primordial nature and so his account of the limits ofpraxis."168 In order to 
show that Heidegger has a robust theory of nature, Fell shows that the strangeness of a 
present-at-hand mood of anxiety is a disclosure of primordial nature. To Fell, "the 
presentness-at-hand of primordial nature is disclosed in an anxious failure of 
understanding." 169 However, this is quite the leap. An anxious way ofbeing-in-the-world 
does not relate Dasein to presence-at-hand or to primordial nature. Indeed, when we 
consider that Heidegger associates primordiality with readiness-to-hand and states that 
Dasein cannot encounter the nature that "stirs and strives" through presence-at-hand, we 
find no basis for a present-at-hand primordial nature. 
Nonetheless, Fell remarks that Heidegger in Being and Time "leaves no doubt" 
that anxiety and the strange "describe sheer presentness-at-hand." 170 We read that: 
The nothingness of the world in the face of which anxiety is anxious does 
not mean that an absence of innerworldly things objectively present 
[present-at-hand] is experienced in anxiety. They must be encountered in 
just such a way that they are of no relevance whatsoever, but can show 
themselves in a barren mercilessness. 171 
168 Ibid., p. 68. 
169 Ibid., p. 76. 
I 70 Ibid., p. 70 
171 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 343 . 
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Granted that anxiety can disclose present-at-hand beings in "a barren mercilessness," is 
there further evidence for the position that anxiety refers to presence-at-hand? Heidegger 
states ... 
... that in the face of which one has anxiety is not encountered as something 
definite to be taken care of; the threat does not come from something at 
hand [ready-to-hand] and objectively present [present-at-hand], but rather 
from the fact that everything at hand [ready-to-hand] and objectively 
present [present-at-hand] absolutely has nothing more to "say" to us. 172 
Thus, anxiety does not issue from something present-at-hand, but rather originates in the 
face of"nothing." Heidegger states that "nothing which is at hand [ready-to-hand] and 
present [present-at-hand] within the world functions as that which anxiety is anxious 
about."173 The object of anxiety appears rather as the being-in-the-world of Dasein. The 
world and "nothingness" is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious. Thus, rather than 
there being a substantial cmmection between anxiety and the present-at-hand, anxiety is 
not anxious about the present-at-hand. 
Though Fell admits that Being and Time prioritizes readiness-to-hand over 
presence-at-hand from the standpoint of average everydayness, Fell believes that the 
present-at-hand has priority over the ready-to-hand from the standpoint of anxiety. 
Anxiety makes possible the disclosure of readiness-to-hand because "the original 
experience of the strange is the ground-possibility of any practical comportment, of any 
becoming-familiar with equipment." 174 Moreover, the "disclosure of beings as present-
at-hand in anxiety is the original ground-possibility of both the presentness-at-hand of the 
172 Ibid., p. 343. 
173 Ibid., p. 186. 
174 Joseph Fell, "The Familiar and the Strange," p. 70. 
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theoretical object of science and the readiness-to-hand of the equipment of everyday 
praxis." 175 On the basis ofthe association of anxiety with the present-at-hand, Fell 
declares that beings are "originally" or "primordially" present-at-hand. The present-at-
hand is "brought out of hiding by overt anxiety as an 'original' or 'primordial' disclosure 
ofbeings,"176 and, in the "routine disclosure of the ready-to-hand the anxious disclosure 
of present-at-hand nature is already being covered over."177 
However, this line of argument, in which the strangeness of the present-at-hand is 
prior to the familiarity of the ready-to-hand, ignores that anxiety does not possess the 
kind ofbeing of presence-at-hand. It ignores that the primordial relations constitutive of 
Dasein are understood through Dasein's familiarity with the world and that Heidegger 
founds the present-at-hand on the ready-to-hand. We have shown that what is nearest to 
Dasein and is "first and for the most part" is a pragmatic engagement with useful things 
in a context ofuse and production. This ready-to-hand mode ofbeing is itself prior to the 
present-at-hand that Fell associates with anxiety. Dasein is primordially in the world in a 
way that handily uses useful things, and cases of presence-at-hand arise only when there 
is a deficiency in the handy way Dasein is taken in by the world. Being and Time does 
not support Fell's idea of a present-at-hand anxiety. 
Fell thinks that "in the order of authentic recognition or retrieval, the presentness-
at-hand disclosed in anxiety is seen to have a certain priority over a still merely possible 
175 Ibid., p. 70. 
176 Ibid., p. 71. 
177 Ibid., p. 71. 
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readiness-to-hand." 178 Moreover, for Dasein "an authentic remembering of its anxious 
temporal basis would require recognition of and resignation to the severe limits of 
praxis."179 Praxis may be limited, but the modification of inauthenticity in an authentic 
mode of being does not modify the pragmatic nature of being-in-the-world. Contrary to 
Fell, an authentic mode of being-in-the-world maintains itself in the midst of ready-to-
hand uses and production. In the order of authentic retrieval, presence-at-hand does not 
have priority over readiness-to-hand since it is a deficient mode ofbeing-in-the-world. 
Fell's notion that there is a priority given to the anxious disclosure of a present-at-
hand nature is not supported by Being and Time. Fell cannot overturn the view that 
Dasein exists in a pragmatic world that originally discloses equipment. Ultimately, 
nature, in Being and Time has a "deficient" and "derivative" status from an 
enviromnental perspective insofar as it is understood instrumentally through a set of 
pragmatic ready-to-hand engagements that subordinate it in production. Fell's account of 
a present-at-hand primordial nature that anxiety discloses does not distance us from our 
hypothesis that Being and Time understands being-in-the-world through a technological 
horizon. 
3.2 
In "Can Heidegger' s Craftsman Be Authentic?" Paul Farwell examines whether 
the productive craftsman of Being and Time authentically resides in the world. Contrary 
to my argument that the producer exists authentically, Farwell argues that the productive 
178 Ibid., p. 72. 
179 Ibid., p. 77. 
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work of craftsmanship is primarily inauthentic. Although Farwell is right to indicate that 
craftsmanship corresponds to inauthentic temporality, we will show that Farwell cannot 
overturn our understanding that producing possesses an authentic status in Being and 
Time. 
Farwell shows that "The Temporality of Circumspective Taking Care" in Division 
Two of Being and Time clarifies that "inauthentic temporality is by definition the 
temporality that characterizes the craftsman's workshop activities."180 Inauthentic 
temporality and the temporality in which the craftsman takes care of his tools both pertain 
to an awaiting, making present, and forgetting.181 Thus, the very act of using tools, 
insofar as it falls within the inauthentic temporal schema of "awaiting/ retaining/making 
present," renders the craftsman inauthentic. 
In Farwell's fonnulation, Dasein in its authentic being is indifferent to any 
pragmatic concerns as authenticity arises from a fundamental disengagement from 
worldly concerns. The authentic confrontation ofDasein with its temporal limits is 
hidden by Dasein's absorption in the inauthentic present of a world of productive work. 
As such, the tools themselves "lure Dasein into inauthenticity," 182 and "the world of an 
authentic Dasein would look more like a world of broken hammers." 183 
180 Paul Farwell, "Can Heidegger' s Craftsman Be Authentic," International 
Philosophical Quarterly 29, No. 1 (1989): 80. 
181 See: Martin Heidegger, Being and Time p. 337-9 and p. 352-6. 
182 Paul Farwell, "Can Heidegger's Craftsman Be Authentic," p. 89. 
183 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Farwell's position is appropriately nuanced. Though he maintains craftsmanship 
is primarily inauthentic, "the craftsman need not leave his workshop to achieve 
authenticity." 184 Authenticity is a modified way in which Dasein seizes upon average 
everydayness. Thus, Dasein can authentically exist in the average everyday way it uses 
the environment. However, whether Farwell can square the above comment about the 
authentic craftsman with his conclusion that the authentic world is "a world ofbroken 
hammers" seems suspect. 
Farwell has a peculiar understanding ofHeidegger's claim that "the authentic 
existence ofDasein also maintains in such taking care [the using, handling, and 
producing of things] , even if it remains 'indifferent' for it." 185 For Farwell, this claim 
means "an authentic Dasein is a being-in-the-world, even if it is indifferently so."186 
Surely, however, the point is that the using and producing of the craftsman is authentic. 
Heidegger's explicit statement would seem to undennine Farwell's position that the 
productive engagements ofDasein are inauthentic. It may not, as Farwell suggests, be 
incidental that productive concerns may be a matter of indifference, but this does not 
change that in using and producing a craftsman maintains himself authentically. 
Farwell tells us that a broken hammer makes us aware of the world, but does not 
tell us that a hammer that inconspicuously functions is understood positively. To 
Farwell, the authentic moment is when the hammer breaks and "Dasein breaks from its 
184 Ibid., p. 82. 
185 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 352. 
186 Paul Farwell, "Can Heidegger's Craftsman Be Authentic," p. 86. 
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engagement."187 However, the present-at-hand moment in which Dasein can no longer 
engage with its world is a deficiency that does not have priority over ready-to-hand 
productive engagements. The way Dasein primordially relates to phenomena is through 
handily using equipment, and this primordial cotmotation to producing implies that there 
is something authentic about production. Though authenticity, as something existential, 
is not essentially formed out of handy productive practices, a producer can certainly be 
authentic in his workshop. Dasein's productive engagements are still fundamentally 
positive, primordial, and authentic. 
Farwell has justly pointed out a way in which, vis-a-vis temporality, Dasein's 
using and producing with equipment is inauthentic and rightly shows that pragmatic 
concerns are not the ultimate object of authenticity. For Farwell, the craftsman must 
break from his workshop in order to be authentic. However, Heidegger still understands 
using and producing to possess a positive phenomenal significance, and Farwell does not 
adequately concede that using and producing are coextensive with authenticity. 
Ultimately, our position that Heidegger prescribes a pragmatic mode of being to be 
authentic is supported by Being and Time as authenticity, as we have shown, maintains 
itself in the productive activities of the craftsman. Thus, the authentic moment is not, to 
our mind, a break from Dasein's engagements, but a modification from within the very 
average everyday engagements ofDasein in a productive world. 
187 Ibid., p. 88. 
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3.3 
We will now assess W. S. K. Cameron's "Heidegger's Concept of the 
Environment in Being and Time." Cameron astutely shows that Being and Time may be 
inconsistent with enviromnentalism because it understands the enviromnent 
instrumentally and is anthropocentric. Cameron, however, is unsuccessful in attempting 
to allay this worry and does not show that Being and Time is consistent with 
enviromnentalism. 
Cameron recognizes that, from an enviromnental standpoint, Being and Time 
raises "alarm." Being and Time is anthropocentric in two major ways: Dasein is 
categorically distinct from other biological beings as the only being of value and Dasein 
constitutes its enviromnent in terms of instrumental relations. The instrumental 
conception of the environment is evident because "Dasein becomes aware of its 
enviromnent as a region of ready-to-hand equipment characterized by its serviceability, 
conduciveness, usability, and manipulability."188 Thus, it would seem that Being and 
Time does not affinn the intrinsic value of the enviromnent. 
Cameron' s argument is that neither Heidegger's "anthropocentric c01mnitments 
nor Dasein's original and never abandoned orientation to use are problematic per se." 189 
To Cameron, "Heidegger leaves open the possibility that Dasein could develop a non-
188 W.S.K. Cameron, "Heidegger's Concept of the Enviromnent in Being and Time." 
Environmental Philosophy 1, No. 1 (2004): 34. 
189 Ibid., p. 35. 
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instrumental relation to the natural world."19° Cameron believes he can dispel the 
suspicion that Being and Time is inconsistent with enviromnentalism and show that 
Being and Time can ground a non-instrumental understanding of the enviromnent. 
Cameron admits the content of Being and Time is not helpful in supporting the 
claim that there is a non-instrumental understanding of the enviromnent: "We'd be on 
finner ground ifHeidegger had offered examples of things that could not adequately be 
regarded from an instrumental perspective; since he does not, we can only surmise an 
argument from silence." 191 If"an argument from silence" is all that we have, then it is 
quite apparent that the only understanding of nature in Being and Time is instrumental. 
However, Cameron insists Heidegger maintains that a non-instrumental way of being is 
possible: "IfHeidegger never denies that we could regard a thing in a non-instrumental 
way, that bare possibility stands against Heidegger' s exclusively instrumental 
examples."192 Cameron here, as in other places, uses an excessive sense of possibility to 
argue for the compatibility of Being and Time with enviromnentalism. 
To Cameron, the environment in Being and Time does not only consist of tools. 
The enviromnent as a whole is not instrumental as the referential totality "is not a tool, 
but rather the condition of the possibility of encountering and using tools."193 However, 
Cameron admits "this reassurance is wan." 194 Even if the referential totality that 
190 Ibid., p. 35. 
19 1 Ibid., p. 38. 
192 Ibid., p. 38. 
193 Ibid., p. 38. 
194 Ibid., p. 38. 
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conditions the tool-using practices of Dasein is not itself an instrument, it is 
fundamentally not environmental insofar as it delineates the domain of objects in the 
world to be equipment subject to instrumental uses. The enviromnent as a whole, insofar 
as worldliness discloses the world to be ready-to-hand, is still the instrumental workshop 
for the use of equipment. 
Cameron thinks an instrumental attitude can be problematic, but argues that an 
instrumental orientation towards nature is "unavoidable and presumptively good." 195 Our 
pursuit of food, shelter, and other needs is inseparable from an orientation that makes use 
of tools. Use is not disrespectful, Cameron argues, as even enviromnentalists "use" a 
mountain when they hike across it and "use" other people in their social relations. 
Human life requires instrumental relations with other people and things, and, thus, use is 
fundamental to our identity. 
It is rather contrary to enviromnentalism, however, to justify use of the 
environment in this way. Surely, there is a qualitative difference between the hiker who 
uses the mountain by hiking and the mining company that seeks to use it as a raw 
material, and, surely, it is appropriate to treat people as ends in themselves rather than to 
instrumentally use people. Cameron, moreover, is evading his earlier critique of the 
instrumental conception of the environment in Being and Time and is now arguing 
enviromnentalism should accept an instrumental conception of the environment. 
195 Ibid., p. 38. 
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Since we treat humans instrumentally, we are not, Cameron reasons, in a position 
to deplore the instrumental conception of the natural world. Thus, "even if the 
biocentricist rightly demands our acknowledgement of the value of the natural world, she 
cannot complain that we regard that world instrumentally."196 Again, we take issue with 
the claim that an instrumental social relation can justify an instrumental relation to nature. 
Both practices are problematic and the way in which we ought to treat persons, id est, as 
ends in themselves, is indicative of the non-instrumental way we ought to treat nature. 
Biocentricism aims to engender respect for all living creatures and for 
ecosystems, but Cameron states: "I have not found any passage in Being and Time that 
unambiguously asserts the intrinsic value of the non-human environment."197 Though, 
surely, this signifies to us that Being and Time may be inconsistent with 
environmentalism, Cameron believes "Heidegger provides resources for understanding 
how the environment's inherent value could come to be recognized."198 However, what 
we are looking for as environmentalists, and what neither Being and Time nor Cameron 
provide, is a conception of the intrinsic value of nature. 
Though Heidegger categorically distinguishes Dasein from non-Dasein beings, 
"he draws no further conclusions about Dasein's moral priority to what is not Dasein."199 
Heidegger, according to Cameron, does not negate the possibility that other creatures 
have intrinsic value. Thus, "Heidegger may thus suggest that we can and perhaps will 
196 Ibid., p. 39. 
197 Ibid., p. 40. 
198 Ibid., p. 40. 
199 Ibid., p. 40. 
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eventually regard aspects of the natural world as intrinsically valuable."200 Moreover, 
"Heidegger may not demonstrate the necessity of such [biocentric] changes, but at least 
his theory is open to their possibility."20 1 These claims about the merely possible ignore 
the explicit content of Being and Time. Being and Time does not biocentrically 
understand the enviromnent as Cameron has not overturned his original insight into the 
anthropocentric and instrumental nature of Being and Time. 
Heidegger's prioritization ofDasein is not problematic, according to Cameron, 
insofar as Dasein is the being that ought to be respectful to nature and is the being that is 
morally accountable. Cameron argues that biocentricism is consistent with Heidegger's 
prioritization ofDasein because it inevitably will be human beings who declare the 
meaning and value of nature. The very claim to demand respect for nature can only 
address humans insofar as we are the only species that can be held accountable. Cameron 
states that, with this in mind, "Heidegger's defence ofDasein's epistemic and pragmatic 
priority appear less problematic."202 
Heidegger, according to Cameron, does not commit "to a traditional distinction 
between an instrumentally valuable world and intrinsically valuable Dasein."203 
However, Heidegger does commit to exactly this position. The natural world is a 
referential totality of relevant ready-to-hand equipment as nature is fundamentally 
understood to be an instrument. Contrary to Cameron, the enviromnent is defined solely 
200 Ibid., p. 41. 
20 1 Ibid., p. 41. 
202 Ibid., p. 42. 
203 Ibid., p. 42. 
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through Dasein's instrumental concern, and Heidegger does not suggest how a non-
instrumental relation to the environment could develop. Even though Heidegger never 
explicitly denies that Dasein could exist in a way that "stirs and strives," the only kind of 
disclosure of nature in Being and Time is instrumental. As Heidegger does not provide a 
conception of the natural world that is intrinsically valuable, we can, contrary to 
Cameron, conclude that Being and Time is environmentally problematic. 
Cameron concludes by stating that in Being and Time "the environment is not 
defined solely through Dasein's instrumental concem."204 Moreover, Heidegger does not 
rule out the possibility of non-instrumental relations to nature and Being and Time even 
"suggests how they can develop."205 However, we have seen that this argument is 
erroneous. Being and Time does not establish how Dasein can biocentrically relate to its 
environment as the environment is understood instrumentally and anthropocentrically 
through ready-to-hand productive uses. Cameron states the problem of Being and Time 
with respect to environmentalism, but does not convince us that Heidegger resolves this 
problem. If there were a non-instrumental biocentric relation to nature in Being and 
Time, Cameron certainly does not bring it to light. 
204 Ibid., p. 42. 
205 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Chapter Four 
4.1 
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether the philosophy of Martin Heidegger 
in Being and Time is consistent with environmentalism. We are now at the stage of our 
investigation where we can review the evidence at hand and offer a final conclusion with 
regards to our question. First, we will reflect on the environmental significance of use 
and production being constitutive of being-in-the-world. Second, we will detennine how 
my definition of environmentalism and technology applies to Being and Time. Third, we 
will examine the resemblance between the nature of being-in-the-world and a 
technological horizon, and, lastly, we will deliver a verdict as to whether Being and Time 
is consistent with environmentalism. 
Heidegger discloses the way ofbeing nearest to Dasein to be one of use and 
production, but this very way ofbeing can lead into an environmental crisis. Insofar as 
Dasein utilizes nature and is primarily a being that produces, Dasein reduces nature to a 
mere raw material and exploits the natural resources of the enviromnent. One uses oil for 
gas, trees for timber, and the mountain for quarry, but the extent to which one uses and 
produces is a measure of one's ecological footprint. Understanding nature solely to be 
something serviceable to uses undermines the capacity for natural beings to possess a 
meaning that demands the respect of human beings. In Being and Time, the ecological 
moment in which the environment is no longer "at hand" for handy uses is a mere 
deficiency, and nature, as such, is understood through its productive handiness. 
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Is the kind of use that Heidegger has in mind in Being and Time environmentally 
benign? Insofar as Heidegger describes a handy mode of being that uses its enviromnent 
in a context in which Dasein "lets be," it would seem that the kind of use Heidegger has 
in mind may be environmentally benign. However, an enviromnental standpoint simply 
cannot forget that Heidegger understands nature as a raw material such that the use of the 
enviromnent exploitatively uses-up nature. Insofar as "the forest is timber," the 
productive use of the environment that characterizes being-in-the-world does not merely 
"let be," but, rather, manipulates the enviromnent in a hannful way. 
Heidegger refrains from understanding nature in its unhandy "stirring and 
striving," and understands the environment through a seemingly technological paradigm 
that views the objects of nature as useful entities whose meaning is their productive 
handiness. However, one does not think of all the things one concerns oneself with as 
useful in the pragmatic manner of equipment nor can the nature of things at hand be 
understood solely through use. An icon such as a crucifix, a natural entity such as a tree, 
or a piece of art cannot be understood through an equipmental schema. Similarly, the 
everyday objects one uses possess values not reducible to use. One does not merely use 
the bed one sleeps on or the house one lives in.206 An enviromnental way of being 
embodies this sense by which the things with which one lives are not understood through 
their usability. 
206 In keeping with the ecological philosophy of the later Heidegger in writings such as 
"Building Dwelling Thinking," one could say that, rather than merely using such things, 
one dwells with one's bed and house. 
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It is environmentally problematic that Being and Time is not able to account for 
entities that are not useful things. A natural being, such as a rock or tree, which is 
fundamentally outside the arena of human productive work, is a being that is also outside 
the domain ofHeidegger's phenomenological ontology. Environmentalism sees value in 
trees, mountains, and other species in a way that places the handiness of such natural 
objects secondary to the ecological meaning of such beings. Insofar as Heidegger 
understands nature through use and production and argues that handiness is the 
fundamental way something is an object of concern, the ability to recognize an ecological 
meaning in natural beings is not evident in Being and Time. 
Is Heidegger not right to say that the average everyday way nearest to Dasein is 
one of use? Is not use fundamental to human action? We can agree that the average 
everyday way that Dasein is in the world is one that is guided to a significant extent by 
uses and production, but Heidegger, with his emphasis on useful things, handiness, 
production, etcetera, overstates the extent to which this is primary. If, as in primitive 
society, Dasein is capable of a way of being that is not constituted by handiness and 
useful things, then it is possible that what is nearest to Dasein is not use and production. 
Heidegger describes the existence of Dasein within a framework that seems to reinforce 
the sense that there is nothing problematic about technologically using the environment 
as a raw material or production being primary. Instead of opening space for the 
possibility of a way of being that does not merely use the environment as a raw material, 
being itself is understood as the object of production and the partiality of Being and Time 
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bears the marks of a technological and pragmatic philosophy that overstates the extent to 
which use and production found being-in-the-world. 
4.2 
We shall currently look at our definition of enviromnentalism and technology in 
light of our aim to assess the consistency of Being and Time with enviromnentalism. In 
tenns of our definition of enviromnentalism, Being and Time does not give nature a 
robust biocentric meaning, does not develop a way in which Dasein hannonizes its 
existence with nature, and does not aim to conserve the natural integrity of the 
enviromnent. In tenns of our definition of technology, Being and Time orients itself 
towards the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production, interprets being-
in-the-world within a framework in which there is a totalizing mobilization of resources 
for production, and establishes a technological framework in which Dasein will produce 
beyond what is sustainable. Being and Time is, on the whole, technological. 
We have to first concern ourselves with what we deemed to be an ambiguous 
form of support for enviromnentalism. "Letting be," in a weak sense, conserves nature 
and reduces technological production. However, "letting be" occurs in a context in 
which entities possess a functional handiness for relevant uses. In "letting be," Dasein is 
not relating to nature "in-itself," but to handy useful things. Letting a hammer be 
relevant for hammering or a pen be relevant for writing is not substantial enough to 
change the dominant pragmatic and technological orientation of Being and Time. As it 
concerns the relevance through which Dasein handily uses equipment and cannot change 
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the instrumental conception of nature as a raw material, "letting be" is not sufficient to 
render Being and Time consistent with environmentalism; nor can "letting be" alter the 
technological implications of Being and Time that repeat themselves again and again. 
Why is Being and Time inconsistent with our definition of environmentalism? 
Heidegger passes over understanding nature as something that "stirs and strives" and 
understands it in light of its uses. This productive relation of Dasein to the environment 
inevitably brings about the exploitation of nature in which natural beings are objectified 
into handy products. In Being and Time, nature merely functions as a raw material for 
instrumental use and there is no sense in which nature is understood to possess a meaning 
that calls for Dasein to respect nature. Being and Time does not recognize the intrinsic 
value of nature. Being and Time does not prescribe harmony with nature as there is no 
ecological account ofDasein's interconnections with nature. Given the dreaded 
instrumental definition of nature as a raw material that is totally handy for production, 
Being and Time understands nature as a resource and does not prescribe the conservation 
of nature. 
In what way does the disclosure ofbeing-in-the-world in Being and Time 
conform to our definition of technology? We have said that technology is a practice 
oriented towards the use and manipulation of nature for the sake of production and 
consumption. Heidegger takes this technological orientation as the basis of his 
understanding of being-in-the-world. As in a technological horizon, use and production 
are nearest to Dasein, being is what is used and produced, and handy useful things are 
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what Dasein primordially uses in its environment. Nature, moreover, is discovered as a 
product and is an instrumental raw material. Heidegger prioritizes a handy mode of 
being and understands authenticity to be consistent with the handy using and producing 
of the enviromnent. If technology is a set of practices oriented towards the use and 
manipulation of nature for the sake of production and consumption, then Being and Time 
is, on the whole, technological. 
More than merely involving use of the environment, modem teclmology is the 
machinery, equipment, and products produced from industrial modes of production and it 
implies a total mobilization of nature for production such that nature becomes a mere raw 
material. There is an ambiguity as to whether the kind of production in Being and Time 
is industrial and, hence, technological. We have argued that there is, in Being and Time, 
a technological framework implicit in the total mobilization of nature as a raw material. 
Beyond this, however, it is not clear that the understanding of the enviromnent cannot 
apply to craftsmanship. The kinds of examples of things produced include hammers, 
pens, needles, clocks, leather, nails, tongs, bridges, and buildings. These kinds of 
products are all potentially works of craftsmanship, and, though Heidegger does 
technologically understand nature as a handy raw material subject to a total productive 
mobilization, it is not clear that Being and Time is definitively teclmological insofar as 
the kind of production may not be industrial. 
The final aspect of our definition of technology to consider is that technology 
unreasonably challenges nature to supply energy beyond what it can sustainably produce. 
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We see that Being and Time is guilty of this insofar as nature is understood through its 
handiness as a raw material. Understanding use and production to be nearest to Dasein 
and understanding things as pragmatic equipment are fonnulas for unsustainability. To a 
significant extent, Dasein will challenge nature beyond enviromnentallimits if it 
maintains itself within the way ofbeing Being and Time prescribes. 
We have seen that Being and Time is not consistent with our definition of 
enviromnentalism. Being and Time, on the whole, is teclmological insofar as the schema 
through which Dasein pragmatically goes about using the enviromnent is fundamentally 
productive, totally mobilizes nature as a raw material, and will lead to environmental 
exploitation beyond what is sustainable. The ambiguity as to whether the production 
specific to Being and Time is industrial is a possible exception to this technological 
nature. However, Dreyfus has shown that Being and Time characterizes Dasein's being-
in-the-world in an industrial way in that Dasein cares for equipment in the sense of 
inspecting industrial operations, and, as we are about to show, Being and Time 
fundamentally understands being-in-the-world through a technological horizon. 
4.3 
We have to ask ourselves: what is the way ofbeing that belongs to a technological 
horizon? Presumably, in a technological paradigm a way of being would possess a 
deficient status insofar as it refrains from the production, use, and manipulation of the 
enviromnent. The way ofbeing nearest to Dasein would be one that uses and produces, 
and being itself would be the object ofuse and production. It would not so much be that 
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Dasein encounters things, but, rather, Dasein would encounter pragmatic equipment. In a 
technological horizon, the primordial way Dasein deals with the world would be through 
the handiness in which Dasein pragmatically uses useful things. This pragmatic 
handiness would, in a technological horizon, indicate to us the very being of what we 
encounter in our environment. Nature, in a technological horizon, would be discovered 
instrumentally through production, would be a raw material, and natural beings would be 
equivalent to productive entities such that, for instance, tree is timber. An understanding 
of the world would arise through a disclosure of the handiness of the production 
workshop in which Dasein uses useful things. Something such as a sign would be 
pragmatically understood as a handy useful thing. The appropriateness of something for 
something would be determined pragmatically through use or serviceability. The 
relevance that constitutes the being of beings would concern pragmatic references such as 
serviceability and confirm that handiness is the kind ofbeing that genuinely belongs to 
things. The structure of the worldliness of the world would be identified with a 
significance that always already reveals "things" to be handy. Lastly, a technological 
horizon would consider an authentic mode of being-in-the-world to maintain itself in the 
average everyday using, producing, and manipulating of the enviromnent. 
What is it that we have established in the above analysis? It is clear that the kind 
ofbeing-in-the-world that a technological horizon "would" engender is the kind of being-
in-the-world that Heidegger prescribes for Dasein in Being and Time. Therefore, the 
hypothesis we have put forward at the beginning of our thesis is fundamentally correct. 
Being and Time understands being-in-the-world to operate within a technological 
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horizon. Being and Time sets in place the technological horizon that subjects nature to 
environmental exploitation. 
4.4 
I have just put forward a decisive criticism of Being and Time. We have shown 
that Being and Time understands being-in-the-world through a teclmological horizon. 
Being and Time repeatedly adopts a pragmatic and technological understanding ofbeing-
in-the-world. Furthermore, the scholarly literature has not shown Being and Time to be 
consistent with environmentalism and Dreyfus very nearly declares Being and Time to be 
fully technological. We have found Being and Time to be contrary to our definition of 
environmentalism and consistent with our definition of technology. All these factors 
indicate that Being and Time is not consistent with environmentalism. 
Due to all the factors we have enumerated, we can finally, as it were, deliver a 
verdict: Being and Time is inconsistent with environmentalism. More than merely not 
offering any substantial environmental insight, Being and Time has a negative 
environmental significance and is anti-environmental insofar as it describes Dasein 
within a technological horizon. As Dreyfus has shown, Being and Time prepares the way 
for technological nihilism. The most basic prerequisite for a philosophy to be consistent 
with environmentalism is an account of nature as a meaningful and valuable order. Not 
only does Being and Time not have this, but the conception of nature Being and Time 
does have teclmologically understands being-in-the-world through the handiness of 
pragmatic dealings that render nature a raw material. This productive and technological 
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conception of nature arrests the possibility of understanding the intrinsic value of nature. 
As an environmentalist, I think it is evident that Being and Time is not consistent with 
environmentalism because it fundamentally orients Dasein to the environment through a 
teclmological horizon in which Dasein uses nature and produces without any sense that 
nature has intrinsic value. If my thesis has gone substantially in the direction of showing, 
in the face of environmental concerns that are of grave importance for our modern 
culture, that in Being and Time Heidegger is not a reliable figure in presenting an 
enviromnental philosophy, then I believe my thesis has been a progressive contribution to 
knowledge in the humanities. 
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